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GENERAL PROVISIONS 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 
The 1986 Annual Survey described the "check it back to local law" approach 
to the Code's choice of law rules. 1 Recent cases emphasize this. For example, in 
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Madaus v. November Hill Farm, lnc.,2 the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia applied the Virginia pre-Code conflict of laws rules to a 
dispute between a West German seller of a horse and a Virginia buyer. The 
court applied the Virginia rule that the law applicable to the validity of a 
contract is the law of the jurisdiction where the final act necessary to make the 
contract binding was done. Since this was the sending of a telex from West 
Germany, under the "mail box" rule, the contract was formed in West Ger-
many and its law applied.3 Equally, since delivery took place in West Germany, 
that law also governed performance. 
In Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Manufacturing Co.,4 the court ruled 
that the Mississippi tort conflict of laws rules applied to indemnity claims based 
on breach of warranty, as well as common law indemnity claims. On this basis, 
the court applied what it called the Mississippi "center of gravity" test, which 
seems not to vary too much from the more general "most significant relation-
ship" test of section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.5 Since 
the case involved the installation of a vinyl liner in a swimming pool in 
Mississippi, the court ruled that Mississippi law applied despite the fact that 
the liner was fabricated in Illinois by the third-party defendant from materials 
produced in Ohio by B.F. Goodrich Co., fourth-party defendant. 
Interestingly, one of several factors considered by the court was the state of 
development of the rules of both common law indemnity and indemnity for 
breach of warranty. Mississippi's rules were thought to be more developed.6 
The court also considered the ease of determining and applying the law. Since 
the court and the attorneys were located in Mississippi, this factor also pointed 
to Mississippi as the center of gravity.7 
On the other hand, in Price v. Litton Systems,8 the Fifth Circuit remanded a 
case for district court determination of whether Mississippi law or Alabama law 
2. 630 F. Supp. 1246, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 24 (W.D. Va. 1986). 
3. Id. at 1249, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 28. 
4. 634 F. Supp. 1480, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 775 (N.D. Miss. 1986). 
5. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 ( 1971) provides: 
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own 
state on choice of law. 
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice or the applicable rule or 
law include 
(a) the needs or the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies or the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies or other interested states and the relevant interests or those states 
in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection or justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field or law, 
(r) certainty, predictability and uniformity or result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application or the law to be applied. 
6. 634 F. Supp. at 1485, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 782. 
7. Id. 
8. 784 F.2d 600, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1614 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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applied in a suit based on manufacturing defects in night vision goggles, which 
were the alleged cause of a helicopter crash that caused the death of two 
wearers. 
Starting its analysis of the tort claims with the statement that "[a)t least six 
states have contacts with this litigation,''9 the court affirmed the application of 
the .law of Alabama-the place of the accident-to the tort claims. The war-
ranty claims received a different treatment following a Mississippi Supreme 
Court ruling that the "center of gravity" could vary depending on the issue 
being considered.10 The Price court concluded that a claim based on breach of 
warranty "arises in large part under the U.C.C. and not under general tort 
theory."11 The court was immediately faced with a Mississippi non-Code 
statute, which provided that privity was not required to maintain actions for 
personal injury, property damage, or economic loss on any of three theories, 
including breach of warranty. 12 It also faced a Mississippi nonuniform amend-
ment to the U.C.C. section 1-105(1) choice of law rules, providing that the law 
of Mississippi 
shall always govern the rights and duties of the parties in regard to ... the 
necessity for privity of contract to maintain a civil action for breach of 
implied warranties of merchantability or fitness notwithstanding any 
agreement by the parties that the laws of some other state or nation shall 
govern the rights and duties of the parties. 13 
The court remanded the case for the district court to determine the constitu-
tionality of applying Mississippi law to the case, since Mississippi's sole contact 
was its status as the forum state.14 Also, on remand the district court was to 
separately address which state's law should govern the breach of warranty 
claims.15 
9. The states were Mississippi (forum), Alabama (place of accident), California (place of 
design), Virginia (place of manufacture), New Jersey (place of execution of contract of purchase), 
and Texas (domicile of decedent). 
10. Boardman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1985). 
11. 784 F.2d at 607, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1621. 
12. Miss. Code Ann.§ 11-7-20 (Supp. 1986). 
13. Id.§ 75-1-105(1) (1972). 
14. 784 F.2d at 607, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1622. 
15. Id. at 608, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1622. The court concluded by citing: 
See, e.g., Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 577 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1978) (Texas 
wrongful death statute held to govern negligence and strict liability in tort claims; Florida 
wrongful death statute held to govern breach of warranty claims); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore 
Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969) (court applied place of injury rule to the tort claims and 
U.C.C. § 1-105 choice of law rule to warranty claims; court held Georgia law governed both 
sets of claims). (Footnotes omitted.) 
A footnote listed many other such cases. Also, in the Whitaker case on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit's 
special concurrence asserted that U.C.C. § 1-105 only applied when a provision of the U.C.C. was 
dispositive, otherwise a state's general conflict of laws rules applied. 424 F.2d 549, 550-51 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
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Thus, some courts seem able to apply an issue by issue approach to what 
state's law governs, despite the reference in U.C.C. section 1-105( 1) to the 
relationship between the law of a state and the transactions. Yet, in view of the 
confusion on the proper treatment of warranty claims, with two courts reaching 
different results under the law of the same state, the overall result is not the 
best. Thus, conflict of laws is not an area in which uniformity in result or 
prediction of result is made easier by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
HYBRID SALES AND SERVICE CASES 
The dreary litany of cases applying the so-called "predominant purpose test" 
to contracts involving some service elements continues. Five of the eight cases 
examined involved a statute of limitations question. The U.C.C. section 2-725 
four-year statute was not always the one applied, although it did prevail in four 
cases, ranging from the sale of a routinely assembled farm machinery shed,16 to 
the sale and assembly of a heat pump,17 to the assembly, installation, and sale of 
sprinkler systems and irrigation towers,18 to the design, sale, and assembly of 
steel producing services.19 Services were held to predominate in a contract for 
the application of herbicides by airplane in view of the selection of that method 
of application over hand spraying, trailer spraying, and other means. 20 In one 
case, the issue was whether a warranty of workman-like performance existed in 
a contract to supply and install roofing. There was no such warranty.21 Despite 
the general abolition of privity under the U.C.C. and Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to permit a direct suit against a 
subcontractor for breach of a warranty of workman-like performance.22 
Notwithstanding that a contract to print a magazine is considered a service 
contract where there was a course of dealing with open price terms, the court 
applied U.C.C. section 2-305 by analogy to find that the printer's charges were 
equivalent to the reasonable price at the time of delivery.23 
16. Bob Neiner Farms, Inc. v. Hendrix, 141 Ill. App. 3d 499, 490 N.E.2d 257, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 634 ( 1986 ). 
17. Meeks v. Bell, 710 S.W.2d 789, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1118 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1986). 
18. 0.0.M. Farms v. Nakamoto, 718 P.2d 262, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1680 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
19. Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1319 (7th Cir. 1986). 
20. Grossman v. Aerial Farm Serv., 384 N.W.2d 488, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 362 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
21. Manor Junior College v. Kallers, Inc., 352 Pa. Super. 310, 507 A.2d 1245, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 648 (1986). 
22. "We too are compelled to conclude that since there was no privity of contract between 
appellant and Spencer [subcontractor] and since this case does not involve the U.C.C. or Section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, appellant cannot proceed directly against Spencer for 
breach of an implied warranty." 352 Pa. Super. at 318-19, 507 A.2d at 1249, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d at 650. 
23. Printers II, Inc. v. Professionals Publishing, 615 F. Supp. 767, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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Thus, the predominant purpose test does not provide a bright line, as it is not 
based on a cost of goods or other cost analysis, but is a judgment call as to the 
contract's predominant intent. Out of this analysis, courts are apt to evoke that 
which they most want to find. 24 
OTHER STATUTES AFFECTING ARTICLES 2 AND 7 
An unrepealed Kentucky pre-Code statute came as a surprise to the form 
drafters in Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Krieger25 and probably will sur-
prise drafters in other states where such a statute may exist. Seller's reference to 
the terms and conditions on the reverse side of its acknowledgment form was 
below seller's signature on the form. Hence, the court ruled that all the fine 
print on the reverse, including condition no. 22 (an exclusion of consequential 
damages), fell below the signature and was not a part of the agreement under 
Kentucky's interpretation of a statute providing that a writing "shall not be 
deemed to be signed unless the signature is subscribed at the end or close of the 
writing. " 26 
The plaintiff counterclaiming for breach of implied and express warranties, 
in L. Harvey & Son Co. v. jarman,27 failed to show a breach of either type of 
warranty because of its failure to comply with North Carolina's fertilizer 
statute. In any damage action, the statute requires evidence, by analysis of a 
sample, that the fertilizer did not conform to the composition requirements of 
the statute, unless the Commissioner makes one of three statutory findings. 28 
Since there had been no compliance with the statute, the counterclaim was 
dismissed. 
24. See In re Germane Publication Society, 289 F. 509, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (similar statement 
by Learned Hand, J. ). 
25. 710 S.W.2d 869, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). 
26. R.C. Durr Co. v. Bennett Indus., 590 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting K.R.S. 
§ 466.060(1)); Bartelt Aviation v. Dry Lake Coal Co., 682 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). 
27. 76 N.C. App. 191, 333 S.E.2d 47, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 107 (1985). 
28. N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 106-662(e)(4) (1978) reads: 
No suit for damage claimed to result from the use of any lot of mixed fertilizer or fertilizer 
material may be brought unless it shall be shown by an analysis of a sample taken and 
analyzed in accordance with the provisions of this Article, that the said lot of fertilizer as 
represented by a sample or samples taken in accordance with the provisions of this section does 
not conform to the provisions of this Article with respect to the composition of the mixed 
fertilizer or fertilizer material, unless [the Commissioner finds that the manufacturer has 
engaged in specified prohibited activity]. 
The three possible findings of prohibited behavior by the manufacturer are (i) employment of 
ingredients prohibited by the statute in other goods sold in the state, (ii) offering for sale during that 
season of any kind of dishonest or fraudulent goods, or (iii) violation of any provision of the statute 
by the manufacturer or any of its representatives or employees. In Potter v. Tyndall, 22 N.C. App. 
129, 205 S.E.2d 808, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 661, 207 S.E.2d 762 (1974), the court held that the 
statute did not apply when there are false statements that constitute an express warranty of fitness. 
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In Abraham v. Volkswagen of America, lnc.,29 the Second Circuit ruled that 
plaintiffs could not be included in the "100 named plaintiffs" required for a 
class action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.30 Their claims either 
arose in states still requiring privity for a suit in contract against a manufac-
turer31 or were barred by a time or mileage limitation in an express warranty~ 
The time limit was applicable even where the manufacturer knew of the defect 
at the time of sale. 32 The ruling also required that two joint owners be counted 
as one. 
In remanding the case, the court directed the parties to confer and stipulate 
on the named plaintiffs to be eliminated within ten days; it also ordered that 
plaintiffs be given the same opportunity to seek and name new plaintiffs that 
plaintiffs would have had if the class had been certified and the number of 
named plaintiffs had then been reduced to seventy-five. 
In re Great American Veal, lnc. 33 required the court to determine the effect of 
a special trust fund (created by the Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921, as 
amended,34 for unpaid cash sellers of livestock) on claims held by the unpaid 
sellers and a secured creditor of the packer to whom they had sold. A complica-
tion was that the operations of the packer had been taken over by a large unpaid 
consignor of the packer but no funds were paid for the takeover. Since the 
consignor had not complied with the requirements of U.C.C. sections 2-326 or 
9-114, the secured creditor of the packer to whom the livestock had been sold 
prevailed. 
But the court stated that the more important issue was "the validity and 
priority status of the federal statutory lien asserted by"36 the secured creditor, 
which had purchased rights making it the subrogee of the unpaid cash sellers. 
The bankruptcy court refused to apply the usual tracing rules to the secured 
creditor as subrogee and held that in both its capacity as successor to the claims 
of the unpaid cash sellers and its secured creditor capacity, it had priority over 
the claims of the consignor. 
29. 795 F.2d 238, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 681 (2d Cir. 1986). 
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982); id.§ 2310(d)(3)(C) (named plaintiffs must number at least 
100 to maintain class action). 
31. 795 F.2d at 249 n.12, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 689 n.12 (listing Illinois, Indiana, New 
York, Ohio, and Wisconsin as those states still requiring privity). 
32. The plaintiffs relied on Alberti v. General Motors Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1985), 
which held that plaintiffs had valid express warranty claims, without regard to when the break-
downs occurred, if the manufacturer knew of the defects at the time of sale. The Abraham court 
rejected the Alberti analysis as improperly confusing express and implied warranties. 795 F.2d at 
250, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 690. 
33. 59 Bankr. 27, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 565 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985). 
34. 7 u.s.c. § 196(b) (1982). 
35. 59 Bankr. at 32, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 572. 
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THE INTERACTION OF TORT AND CONTRACT: 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
Many cases involve factual patterns potentially creating at least three causes 
of action: negligence, strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, and breach of warranty. Grant Gilmore, when alive, used to 
suggest that a lawyer suing for breach of warranty when suit could be brought 
in negligence or strict liability should, perhaps, be considered insane.36 He 
preferred actions in tort, where there was no (i) requirement of prior notice 
within a reasonable time after the defect should have been discovered,37 (ii) four-
year statute running from the date of delivery,38 or (iii) ability to make 
contractual disclaimers of warranty and limitations of damages.39 Yet, the courts 
seem bent on carving out a separate niche for products liability and warranty 
based on the type of damages involved. On June 16, 1986, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica DeLaval lnc.,4° entered 
the fray. Although the case was in admiralty and any tort would be a maritime 
tort, the scope and thrust of the opinion applies in other settings. First, the court 
joined with other authorities in recognizing a cause of action called products 
liability, including liability based on negligence and strict liability, as a part of 
general maritime law.41 
The case involved suits in tort by charterers of vessels in which defendant 
DeLaval had installed turbines that were defective in design and installation, 
but the only damage was to the product itself and to the vessels' propulsion 
system.42 The opinion states that whether injury to the property itself could be 
recovered in tort "has spawned a variety of answers," none of which are found 
either in the Restatement (Second) of Torts or in the Uniform Commercial 
36. Professor Leary remembers conversations in which this was frequently said using the word 
"certified." 
37. See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). The penalty for not giving notice is to be barred from any remedy. 
38. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1), (2). A discovery rule applies only if two preconditions are satisfied: 
First, the warranty must explicitly extend to future performance; and second, discovery of the 
breach must await that future performance. 
39. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (warranty disclaimers),§ 2-718 (liquidated damages), and§ 2-719 (the 
exclusion or limitation of damages). 
40. 106 S. Ct. 2295, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 609 (1986). 
41. Id. at 2299, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 614 (citing Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 
98, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1945) (products liability based on negligence), aff'd on other grounds, 328 U.S. 
85 (1946); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (strict liability and adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)); Ocean 
Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1984) (strict 
liability)). 
42. The opinion states that "there was no damage to 'other' property. Rather, the ... defectively 
designed turbine components damaged only the turbine itself." Id. at 2300, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
at 615. Where the defect is in a separately purchased component part of an installed unit, the court 
ruled that recoverable property damage must be to property other than the unit serviced by the 
component part. Id. (citing Northern Power and Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 
324, 330 (Alaska 1981)). 
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Code.43 The Court, referring to "landbased solutions," indicated that the poles 
were represented by the majority or California position (where a defective 
product causes only monetary damages, warranty law preempts the field)44 and 
the minority or New Jersey position (allowing tort recovery for injury to the 
product itself whether or not the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm). 45 
In a footnote, the Court recognized that each pole had taken a step toward the 
other. It cited New Jersey's decision in Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford 
Motor Co.,46 discussed in the 1986 Annual Survey, limiting Santor to consumer 
cases, and a 1979 decision in California recognizing a cause of action for 
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage!7 But the Court 
rejected intermediate positions, seeking to differentiate between, for example, 
"the disappointed users" and "the endangered ones,"48 or the nature of the 
defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose!9 The Court 
was also not persuaded by the majority of the courts of appeal sitting in 
admiralty, which had taken the Santor position, because those cases concerned 
fishing vessels and relied on solicitude for fishermen, an attitude "at times" 
shared by Congress.50 
The Court found the intermediary and minority landbased positions unsatis-
factory where no person or property is damaged other than the product itself, 
since the losses, repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits are "essentially the 
failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the 
core concept of contract law."61 The minority view, said the Court, "fails to 
43. 106 S. Ct. at 2300, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 616. In note 3, the court cited Wade, Is Section 
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the U.C.C. and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 
42 Tenn. L. Rev. 123 (1974). The Delaware Supreme Court has taken the position that§ 402A of 
the Restatement may not be applied in cases involving sales even where a resulting fire damaged 
other property. Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 461 (Del. 
1980). 
44. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 15 ( 1965). Five decisions during the survey period followed the California 
position. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1319 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Illinois law); 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotox 
Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1608 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying South 
Carolina law); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 S.W.2d 431, 42 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 100 (Minn. 198S); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist 
& Derrick Co., 714 S.W.2d 919, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1246 (Mo. 1986); Johnson v. 
General Motors Corp., 349 Pa. Super. 147, S02 A.2d 1317, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 8Sl 
(1986). 
4S. Santor v. A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. S2, 207 A.2d 30S, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. 
(Callaghan) S99 (196S). 
46. 98 N.J. SSS, 489 A.2d 660, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1184 (198S); see 1986 
Annual Survey, supra note 1, at 1378. 
47. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, S98 P.2d 60, 1S7 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979). 
48. See, e.g., Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Ore. S87, S9S, S7S P.2d 1383, 1387 (1978). 
49. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 6S2 F.2d 116S, 1173 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
SO. East River Steamship Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 2301 n.S, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 617 n.S. 
SI. Id. at 2302, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 618. 
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arcount for the need to keep products liability and contract law in separate 
spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages."s2 
This last statement of the Court reaches the core of the matter. There is no 
need to keep products law and warranty separate, but there is a need to keep 
separate rules of law serving sound public policy. According to the Court, the 
need is to prevent tort law from eroding the protections to producers and sellers 
arising from the contractual ability to restrict liability (within limits) by 
disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies.s3 Having said that, the Court then 
discussed warranty recovery as permitting recovery of lost profits and did not 
mention the widespread use of clauses excluding recovery of consequential 
damages. It stated that a commercial setting generally does not involve large 
disparities in bargaining power.s• Earlier in the opinion, the Court commented 
that when such losses occur, "the commercial user stands to lose the value of the 
product, risks the displeasure of its customers ... or, as in this case, experiences 
increased costs in performing a service. Losses like these can be insured. "SS 
The real policy question is whether it is socially more efficient to place the 
loss where the cost of insurance will have a preventive effect and will give an 
incentive to test before producing, to produce with care, and to limit the asserted 
purposes that a product may serve. 56 Placing the burden of insurance on 
ultimate users may be counterproductive. 57 First, "chance takers" will not 
insure and will reduce prices. The loss from a bad product may also be 
catastrophic to a small retailer who has to compete with the chance takers to 
survive. Second, the division between economic/monetary loss and personal 
injury loss will not result in much premium saving to manufacturers, since the 
verdicts supposedly causing the present alleged insurance crisis are the large 
personal injury verdicts to which section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts will still apply, as well as U.C.C. section 2-719(3), with its prima facie 
unconscionability rule for disclaimers of consequential damages involving per-
sonal injuries. Since defective products causing personal injury will also cause 
damage to the product itself, is the court suggesting that there must be two 
separate causes of action? Where vertical privity remains, in contract but not in 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 2303, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 620. Due to the availability of insurance, would it not 
be better policy to require expert testimony on current insurance cost and coverage in allocating 
losses? Is separate insurance available for nonpersonal injury products liability and for products 
liability causing personal injury? 
54. Id. The Court cited Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) at 
this point, thus indicating that cases involving consumer contracts may receive a different treatment. 
But what of fishing boats and fishermen? See supra text accompanying note 50. The implication is 
that these cases should no longer be followed. 
55. 106 S. Ct. at 2302, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 619. 
56. Professor Leary was present at hearings before the House and Senate during consideration 
of what ultimately became the Magnusson-Moss Act. The statement in the text was the policy 
asserted by congressional committee staff members and congressional sponsors of the act. 
57. The smaller the amount of the policy, the greater the per-dollar cost of insurance. Also, the 
gathering of statistics to permit actuarial calculation of risks and the fixing of premiums would be 
more difficult. 
1222 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 42, August 1987 
tort, must the damages be itemized so that only the tort damages may be 
asserted against remote manufacturers? 58 
Perhaps the problems cry out for a proper legislative solution59 that is fair to 
product users, product sellers, and product makers. It should also apply to all 
product liability situations, abolishing any distinctions inherited from the for-
mulary writ system, such as between contract and tort. 60 
ARTICLE II-SALES OF GOODS 
CONTRACT FORMATION AND TERMS 
Statute of Frauds 
No decisions of great significance appeared in connection with the application 
of the statute of frauds bar to enforcement, but precedent on the proper solutions 
to some problems is growing. 
Triangle Marketing v. Action Industries61 awarded judgment on the plead-
ings where the writing pied by the plaintiff was its unsolicited purchase order, 
which did not confirm an oral contract and to which no response had been 
made. The court ruled that there was no requirement that the matter await the 
completion of discovery in the hope that defendant would make an admission.62 
58. One should remember that East River Steamship Corp. was brought in admiralty and 
involves only what the court determined to be injuries to the product itself. Perhaps nothing further 
should be drawn from the decision. 
59. In footnote 3, the Court referred to legislation only in Congress, stating in part: 
When S. 100, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985) (the Product Liability Act) was introduced, it 
excluded, § 21(6), recovery for commercial Joss. Suggestions have been made for revising this 
provision. See Amendment 16, 131 Cong. Rec. 3183 (March 19, 1985); Amendment 100, 131 
Cong. Rec. 6090, 6091 (May 14, 1985 ). Other bills also have addressed the issue. See S. 1999, 
131 Cong. Rec. 18321 (Dec. 20, 1985); Amendment 1951, 132 Cong. Rec. 5764 (May 12, 
1986). See also H.R. 2568, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 4425, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(1986). 
Strangely, no mention is made of the numerous State Product Liability Laws, of which there 
were 24 at last count. See Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 705 F.2d 164, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1494 (6th Cir. 1983) (Michigan's products liability statute applies to warranty claims). 
60. Great Britain does not necessarily agree that separate functions must be preserved for tort 
and contract law. See Headly, The Myth of Waiver of Tort, 100 Law Q. Rev. 653, 678 (1984): 
A classification of actions that arose in the early nineteenth century is not necessarily a firm 
basis for judicial policy in the late twentieth century. It is still true (though to an increasingly 
limited extent) that "the forms of action ... rule us from their graves," but this is an 
unavoidable necessity, not an ideal to be emulated. (Footnote omitted.) 
The quotation is from F. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 2 n.20 (1936). See also 
Cane, Physical Loss, Economic Loss and Products Liability, 95 Law Q. Rev. 117 (1979); Fridman, 
The Interaction of Tort and Contract, 93 Law Q. Rev. 422 ( 1977); cf Wallace, Tort Demolishes 
Contract in New Construction, 94 Law Q. Rev. 60 (1978). 
61. 630 F. Supp. 1538, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 36 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
62. The claim that the motion must await the completion of discovery was based on the provision 
in U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b), satisfying the statute of frauds if there is an admission of the contract in a 
party's pleadings or otherwise. But where there is a denial of the contract, the plaintiff should at 
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This demonstrates a touching faith in the observance of the rule that an attorney 
will not deny an allegation without evidence to support the denial. The case 
supports a minority view. 
In another case, an Arizona court63 found conduct indicating acceptance of an 
order for building materials in that the supplier's price quotation was used in 
the purchase order, the order was picked up by the supplier's people at the 
buyer's office, delivery schedules were discussed, and the employees involved 
admitted that they believed they had conveyed a message of acceptance to the 
buyer by reason of a long course of prior dealings. The court concluded that 
"ordinary people do not speak 'legalese.' They do business. Their conduct 
implies the legal conclusion."64 
The court quickly found the statute of frauds to be satisfied based on the 
absence of an objection to the purchase order confirming an oral understanding 
of the previous day, the existence of internal memoranda in the seller's office 
ordering the goods, the preliminary notice of lien filed by the supplier, and the 
testimony of the seller's agents that the order had been accepted. Nonetheless, 
on orders of the Phoenix branch of Owens Corning, its retail branch cancelled 
the contract. 65 
Cases for tortious interference with contract show that attorneys should not 
litigate on such obviously wrong bases, even when hard pressed by recalcitrant 
clients who have wrongfully cancelled an order. This case was for tortious 
interference with contract, as well as breach of contract. The jury awarded 
least provide some credible support for a belief that discovery, limited to the statute of frauds issue, 
would produce the necessary admission or a sufficient writing. Discovery instituted to produce a 
settlement offer should not be tolerated. Prior cases are divided on this issue. 
While neither party in Triangle cited cases, the court's law clerk found a number. Denying 
judgment on the pleadings before discovery were Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 4, 147 S.E.2d 374, 
3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 296 (1966); M.& W. Farm Serv. Co. v. Callison, 285 N.W.2d 
271, 275-76, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1239, 1243-44 (Iowa 1979); Franklin County 
Coop. v. MFC Servs. (A.A.L.), 441 So. 2d 1376, 1378, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1465, 
1467-68 (Miss. 1983); Reissman lnt'l Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Products, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1165, 1167-68 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972); Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373, 378, 15 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 765, 768-69 (N.D. 1974). Cases permitting a judgment were 
Simmons Oil Corp. v. Bulk Sales Corp., 498 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.N.J. 1980); Presti v. Wilson, 
348 F. Supp. 543, 545, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 716, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Boylan v. 
G.L. Morrow Co., 63 N.Y.2d 616, 468 N.E.2d 681 (1984). The last case was a memorandum 
decision of five judges despite a lengthy dissent. 
The Garrison line of cases would make sense if the rule were that when a party asserts the 
statute of frauds to prevent enforcement, a limited discovery would be allowed if requested by the 
other side and restricted to the statute of frauds issue. Then, if no admission is obtained, dismissal 
would follow without waiting for trial. It is only when discovery covers all other issues that a 
defendant is subjected to the very litigation the statute was designed to prevent, an argument the 
Triangle court used to justify no discovery at all. 
63. Custom Roofing Co. v. Alling, 146 Ariz. 388, 706 P.2d 400, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 63 (Ct. App. 1985). 
64. Id. at 390, 706 P.2d at 402, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 64. 
65. Id. at 389, 706 P.2d at 401, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 64. Custom was not an "approved 
contractor" for direct purchases from the manufacturer but had for many years been buying its 
requirements from the manufacturer's retail outlet, not through the regional branch office. 
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$105,000 in punitive damages, and, after a remittitur of compensatory damages, 
the judgment was affirmed. 66 
Where the sale is by auction to be offered in bulk and later sold in parcels, 
with ultimate title going to whichever method produces the most money, can the 
successful bidder for the bulk withdraw before completion of the parcel bid-
ding? In United States v. Conrad,67 the court was faced with a highest bulk 
bidder who sought to withdraw his bid while the sale by lots was in progress. 
To his plea of the statute of frauds, the court ruled that in making a memo of 
the knockdown to the highest bidder and in signing it, the auctioneer's clerk 
acted as agent for both buyer and seller. The court also ruled that the sale was 
final when the hammer fell with a condition precedent to performance that the 
bulk bid be higher than the total of the parcel bids. 68 
In Global Truck & Equipment Co. v. Palmer Machine Works, 69 the oral 
discussions covered twenty-five trailers for hauling washed rock and gravel, but 
the only writing was a purchase order for five. The seller testified that there 
were only export permits and funding for five and that the buyer had merely 
indicated orally an intent to contract for an additional twenty at a later date. 70 
When the deal aborted, the suit could only cover the five trailers, as the quantity 
stated in the writing could not be exceeded. Nor did any of the exceptions help 
since the suit was by the buyer for failure to deliver and defective delivery. 
There was no admission by the party to be charged of a contract for twenty-five, 
nor delivery and payment. The first exception for specially manufactured goods 
applies only to protect the seller. Some members of the subcommittee wonder 
why the objective criteria needed to prove this exception should not be equally 
available to a buyer. 71 
While speaking of the exceptions, one case more has ruled that the exception 
to the statute of frauds applied to goods delivered to and accepted by a 
"noncontractual" third party.72 Stated baldly, the proposition may go too far 
and may too readily enable the debts of the actual recipient to be foisted off on 
another. Here, however, the invoices were made out to the defendant, were hand 
delivered, and were accepted without evidence of any objection. It seems that 
testimony should have been allowed with this objective corroboration. 
In two cases under U.C.C. section 2-201(2),73 the issue was whether a farmer 
is a merchant; both cases held in the affirmative. The Nebraska court pointed 
66. Compensatory damages of $30,000 were reduced to S 14,000 in the trial court before 
judgment. 
67. 619 F. Supp. 1319, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 424 (M.D. Fla. 1985). 
68. Id. at 1322-23, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 429. 
69. 628 F. Supp. 641, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1986). 
70. Id. at 647, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1258. 
71. The objective nature of evidence of commencing work on special materials or special designs 
should be equally persuasive that a contract existed when suit is brought by the buyer. 
72. Dykes Restaurant Supply v. Grimes, 481 So. 2d 1149, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1603 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). 
73. Thunderbird Farms, Inc. v. Abney, 178 Ga. App. 335, 343 S.E.2d 127, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 360 (1986) (doctor owner had incorporated farm to keep it separated from his 
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out that Nebraska's nonuniform change excluding certain sellers of their own 
crops from the merchant coverage of U.C.C. section 2-201(2)74 was not in effect 
at the time of the transactions and so was not applicable. 
Two cases correctly took the position that a failure to respond to a confirma-
tory memorandum did not bar a trial on the defense of no contract. 75 In one of 
these two, Spinnerin Yarn Co. v. Apparel Retail Corp., the court applied the 
statute of frauds provision of U.C.C. section 1-206 to the sale of a business that 
was largely personal property. 
Seminole Peanut Co. v. Goodson 76 ruled that uncertainty as to price in the 
writings did not preclude a contract because, for statute of frauds purposes, only 
a quantity term need be stated and the conduct of the parties evidenced a 
sufficient intent to have an open price contract. The court also ruled that, 
despite full performance by the peanut growers, they could still sue for damages 
for fraud in inducing them to make the contract.77 
In other litigation, a party claimed that because the contractual relationship 
arose out of a settlement agreement terminating a nonmarital relationship, t~e 
statute of frauds did not apply to its modification.78 The claim was not success-
ful, even though unusual. 
Equitable estoppel raised its ugly head in one case. Renfroe v. Ladd79 arqse 
under U.C.C. section 8-319 and the court reiterated its holding in a prior C<l:Se 
under U.C.C. section 2-201 that to permit equitable estoppel as to the statute of 
frauds would be a judicial amendment of the statute. It is difficult to explain the 
holding in light of U.C.C. section 1-103's specific mention of estoppel as a 
supplementary rule of law. 
Unconscionability 
Unconscionability is but one method of policing sales agreements between 
parties.80 An ancient concept,81 unconscionability is codified in section 2-302 of 
medical practice); Agrex, Inc. v. Schrant, 221 Neb. 604, 379 N.W.2d 751, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1213 (1986) (owner regularly marketed grain and followed market). 
74. 6 Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C. § 2-201(2)(b) (1980), added by 1963 Neb. Laws 544. 
75. Spinnerin Yarn Co. v. Apparel Retail Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1174, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (U.C.C. § 2-201); Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 200 
Conn. 172, 510 A.2d 972, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1298 (1986) (U.C.C. § 8-319). 
76. 176 Ga. App. 42, 335 S.E.2d 157, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 74 (1985). 
77. Id. at 45-46, 335 S.E.2d at 160, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 78. 
78. LaRosa v. Fortier, 492 So. 2d 425, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callagpan) 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
79. 701 S.W.2d 148, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 547 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (action under 
U.C.C. § 8-319 relying on cases under U.C.C. § 2-201). 
80. Fraud, misrepresentation, warranty liability, and various statutory protections afforded by 
such acts as the State Retail Installments Sales Acts, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and the 
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, all provide protection to an unwary buyer in the 
marketplace. See generally J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (2d ed. 1980). 
81. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82,100 (Ch. 1750). 
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the Code.82 In applying its provisions, most courts follow the procedural-
substantive unconscionability dichotomy developed by Professor Leff. 83 
While consumers have brought most of the successful cases against merchants 
under section 2-302, merchants can likewise benefit from the section. By 
reliance on section 2-302, merchants can avoid the operation of substantively 
unreasonable contract terms where the relative bargaining power, economic 
strength, or the availability of alternative sources of supply unduly favors the 
other party. 
The ability of merchants to recover under section 2-302 is illustrated by the 
Michigan Court of Appeals decision in Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Cantos, lnc. 84 In 
Gianni, a small manufacturer in the apparel industry successfully challenged 
the cancellation clause in the buyer's standard form purchase contract. The 
challenged clause reserved the buyer's right to terminate, by notice, any pur-
chase orders submitted to the seller either prior to shipment by seller or prior to 
an untimely delivery.85 The trial court made several findings supporting both 
substantive and procedural unconscionability. The findings were based upon a 
marked disparity in both the ~elative bargaining power and economic strength 
of the parties and the absence of an alternative market for plaintiff's goods. 
Substantive unconscionability arpse from the nature of the garment industry 
itself: The "big sharks" are able to impose such clauses because small indepen-
dent manufacturers such as plaintiff have no clout to demand otherwise. 
Procedural unconscionability arose from plaintiff's testimony that he had not 
read the clause and would not have entered into the contract if he had. For these 
reasons, the trial court held the clause unenforceable. The Michigan Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision per curiam.86 
Unconscionability pft!':n arises where one party to a contract seeks (i) to 
disclaim either the impli!'!d warranties87 of fitness for a particular purpose88 or 
merchantability89 or (ii) to limit liability for consequential damages.90 Despite a 
82. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides: 
( 1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have 
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit 
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be 
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to 
its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination. 
83. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 
(1967). 
84. 151 Mich. App. 598, 391 N.W.2d 760, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1433 (1986). 
85. Id. at 600, 391 N.W.2d at 761, 1 l/.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1436. 
86. Id. at 604, 391 N.W.2d at 763, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1436. 
87. U.C.C. § 2-316 requires that a disclaimer of implied warranties be either conspicuous and 
use the word "merchantability" or use words that clearly indicate that no warranty exists. 
88. Id. § 2-315. 
89. Id. § 2-314. 
90. Id. § 2-719. 
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historic disdain for enforcing such disclaimers and limitations where a personal 
injury is involved,91 an injured consumer was denied relief when he was shown 
to have understood the contract well enough to modify some of its other terms 
and to have understood the risks inherent in purchasing the product by virtue of 
his education and special training. In Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp.,92 the 
defendant sold the parts and machinery necessary to construct small passenger 
airplanes. The plaintiff was an expert woodmaker who constructed airplane 
propellers. While he specifically modified several of the terms of defendant's 
form contract, there was no evidence that he attempted to modify the terms of 
defendant's limitation of liability language.93 Plaintiff made a thorough investi-
gation of the product before purchasing it and was a member of the Associates 
Flying Club and the Experimental Aircraft Association. Given these circum-
stances, the Tenth Circuit found the disclaimer provision of the contract to be 
conscionable and, therefore, enforceable against the consumer. Thus, the Tenth 
Circuit reversed this portion of the lower court's decision.94 
Many courts have recognized the applicability by analogy of article 2 to 
transactions not involving the sale of goods. Two cases this year are worthy of 
mention: John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh,95 an equipment leasing case, and 
Best v. United States National Bank of Oregon,96 a class action by consumer 
depositors of a bank challenging the conscionability of nonsufficient funds 
charges assessed against their bank accounts. 
john Deere Leasing involved an adhesion contract in which elements of both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability were established. The lease agree-
ment between the parties entitled the lessee to exercise an option to purchase the 
equipment at a predetermined price only. at the termination of the lease period. 
Despite this limitation, the lease gave the lessor the right to claim as damages 
upon default of the lessee not only the amount remaining due on the lease plus 
interest but also the option-to-purchase price of the equipment. These default 
provisions were in light-colored fine print on the back of the lease. This fine 
print was illegible because the darker print on the front side of the lease showed 
through to the back. While the lessee admitted to having signed the front of the 
lease, he denied having read the back. He testified that he assumed that he was 
91. Id.§ 2-719(3). 
92. 797 F.2d 845, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1540 (10th Cir. 1986). 
93. The pertinent disclaimer language read as follows: "Buyer expressly waives any and all 
claims arising from structural integrity, performance, flight characteristics, mechanical failures, and 
safety against QUICKIE AIRCRAFT CORPORATION." Id. at 848, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 
1549. 
94. The finding was not a total bar to the consumer's recovery. The plaintiff argued and the 
court agreed that if one or more theories of liability were preserved, despite the disclaimer provision, 
the jury's verdict and the court's judgment with respect to those issues should not be challenged. 
Since no authority was found for plaintiff's assertion that strict product liability claims could not be 
destroyed by disclaimers of the type presented, the court remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions to certify this question to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 852, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d at 1550-51. 
95. 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 658 (D. Kan. 1986). 
96. 78 Ore. App. I, 714 P.2d 1049, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 6 (1986). 
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entering into the usual lease with an option contract and that he did not expect 
to be liable for the purchase price should he default. 
Lessee defaulted after making two payments on the lease. Since the lease had 
not yet expired, the option to purchase the equipment had not matured and 
could not validly be exercised by defendant. The lessor repossessed the equip-
ment, sold it, and claimed the above amounts as damages under the terms of the 
lease. 
Under these circumstances, the federal district court found both procedural 
and substantive unconscionability and, therefore, refused to enforce the lease 
default provision. The court premised its finding of procedural unconscionabil-
ity on the defendant's lack of knowledge and the involuntary nature of his assent 
at the formation of the contract. The court found substantive unconscionability 
because the promisor had imposed a penalty on the lessee for terminating the 
lease and failing to exercise the option. 
Best is unique because plaintiffs attempted to use the historically defensive 
provisions of section 2-302 in an affirmative challenge to the bank's allegedly 
exorbitant charges for processing nonsufficient funds checks. Plaintiffs argued 
that the charges were a penalty assessed against bank customers who wrote 
checks on nonsufficient funds, thereby breaching their eontracts with the bank. 
Plaintiffs accordingly requested restitution of those amounts. The Oregon Court 
of Appeals held that while there was a genuine issue of fact as to the bank's 
good faith in assessing charges that greatly exceeded the bank's processing costs, 
section 2-302 does not provide the basis for affirmative relief. 
Battle of the Forms 
Courts seem to try to make U.C.C. section 2-207 do a lot more than Karl 
Llewellyn ever dreamed of in developing his philosophy. Dean John Murray 
has recently characterized the results as the "Chaos of the Battle of the 
Forms."97 He leans toward rewriting the section. 
But perhaps much can be done to improve the situation if courts would apply 
a few ancient, but prescient, rules to the Code and not try to force U.C.C. 
section 2-207 as a solution in all matters involving an exchange of forms. 
Following Lord Coke's maxims, expressed in Heydon's Case,98 the first inquiry 
should be into two things. First, identify the "mischief . . . for which the 
common law did not provide [a remedy],"99 and second, identify precisely the 
remedy "the Parliament hath resolved."100 And it is suggested that all of the 
expressed underlying policies of the Code should also be considered.101 
97. Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1307 (1986). 
98. 3 Co. Rep. 7b, 637 (1584). Also relevant is Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plowden 459, 465 (1573), 
referring to rules of law as composed of both words and spirit and requiring application in 
accordance with the spirit. 
99. 3 Co. Rep. 7b, at 638. 
100. Id. 
101. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(1), (2)(a), (b), (c). The definition of "agreement" in U.C.C. § 1-201(3) is 
based on "the bargain of the parties in fact" (emphasis added). Throughout the sections in parts 2 
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Had the Ninth Circuit panel in Diamond Fruit Growers v. Krack Corp. 102 
pursued this approach in Krack Corp.'s claim for indemnity against its suppli-
ers, the result might have been drastically different on at least two possible 
alternatives. One of these approaches would have involved judicial legerdemain 
instead of a rather complete judicial rewrite of the section.103 
Before the court was a case involving a refrigeration unit manufactured by 
Krack using a tubing coil made by Metal-Matic. An undiscovered or later 
developed pinhole caused an ammonia leak, which damaged Diamond's fruit 
while held for storage. Apparently there was no disclaimer of the warranty of 
merchantability, and suit was in a jurisdiction requiring a comparative negli-
gence solution in indemnity cases. 104 
Forms were exchanged as they had been for some years. 105 Krack sent a 
purchase order to Metal-Matic with no provision concerning consequential 
damages. Metal-Matic replied with an acknowledgment form containing a very 
conspicuous reference to its terms on the reverse. Two were significant. One 
tracked the "unless" clause with which the text of U.C.C. section 2-207(1) 
concludes. 106 The other tracked U.C.C. section 2-719(1)(a), excluding all conse-
quential damages and providing a limited repair, replace, or refund of the 
purchase price limitation on damages recoverable. 107 Apparently, neither clause 
was in Krack's form with the fruit wholesaler. The court held that the evidence 
demonstrated that Krack's purchasing manager sometime before the particular 
transaction had read the terms on the forms and had attempted unsuccessfully to 
have the clauses removed, after which there was no further protest. 108 
and 3 of article 2, there are references in the text and comment to "the intent of the parties," or what 
the parties have intended. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) & comment (para. 3); id. § 2-202; id. 
§ 2-305(1 ). 
102. 794 F.2d 1440, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1073 (9th Cir. 1986). 
103. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-207 puts the section in a position contra 
to several fundamental Code policies. Note that U.C.C. § 2-207 indeed runs counter to several 
fundamental approaches of the Code-particularly the "freedom of contract" principle, the right of 
an offeree to make a counteroffer, and the general rule that consequential damages are not 
recoverable unless so provided "in this Act or in other rule of law." See infra notes 112, 113, & 120 
and accompanying text. 
104. As between manufacturer and supplier, the consequential damages were allocated 70:30. 
105. The exchange of forms here was a bit unusual. At the beginning of each year, Krack sent 
Metal-Matic a form of purchase order setting forth its estimated needs for the coming year. There 
was no reply. The parties agreed no contract was thereby made. Then, as tubing was needed, Krack 
sent a specific order for a quantity on a definite delivery date and Metal-Matic responded on an 
acknowledgement of order form. 
106. Metal-Matic's form on the reverse side provided: "Metal-Matic Inc.'s acceptance of 
purchaser's offer or its offer to purchase is hereby expressly made conditional to purchaser's 
acceptance of the terms and provisions of the acknowledgement form." 797 F.2d at 1441, 1 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d at 1074. At the bottom of the front of the form in bold face capitals was: "SEE 
REVERSE SIDE FOR TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE." Id. 
107. Id. at 1442-43, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1076-77. 
108. Id. at 1441, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1075. How many subsequent transactions there 
were is not stated. 
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The Ninth Circuit ruled that the exclusion of consequential damages was not 
a part of "the contract" but apparently an additional proposal to the contract to 
which there was no specific and express assent by Krack, who fired the "first 
shot." Hence, the forms excluding consequential damages did not become part 
of the contract. 109 The court was apparently convinced that the pre-Code 
"mischieP' to be remedied by U.C.C. section 2-207 was the common law result 
that favored the last shot.110 It apparently felt that the appropriate remedy 
should be an enforced application of the Code gap-filling provisions and damage 
recovery rules, on the ground that such provisions were neutral to the differ-
ences between the "shots." Here, however, the court actually adopted a first shot 
rule. 
There is a total disregard of the grammatical reading of section 2-207(1 )'s 
"unless" clause. The subsection states that a form "operates as an acceptance 
... unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional 
or different terms." When the unless clause is used, the phrase-"operates as an 
acceptance"-is negated. 111 Thus, we are dealing with a counteroffer, not an 
offer and an acceptance with variant terms. 
Nowhere does the Code expressly negate the effect of counteroffers in 
rejecting and terminating an offer. 112 The policy of the Code on freedom of 
contract, and hence freedom to make counteroffers, is set forth in U.C.C. section 
1-102(3) and emphasized in comment 2 as stating "affirmatively at the outset 
109. Id. at 1445, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1081. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) provides for exclusion of 
consequential damages by contract and this right to contract out of liability is referred to in 
comments to both the unconscionability and warranty sections, as well as in the comment to U.C.C. 
§ 1-106. See U.C.C. § 1-102 & comment (referring to freedom of contract as a key principle). 
110. 794 F.2d at 1445, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1080. 
111. Indeed, it is also possible to construe the unless clause as modifying all that precedes it, thus 
defeating the "Definite and seasonable expression of acceptance" clause. The court, however, said: 
Further, in a case such as this one, requiring the seller to assume more liability than it intends 
is not altogether inappropriate. The seller is most responsible for the ambiguity because it 
inserts a term in its form which requires assent to additional terms and then does not enforce 
that requirement. If the seller truly does not want to be bound unless the buyer assents to its 
terms, it can protect itself by not shipping until it obtains that assent. 
Id. at 1445, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1081. This truly shows the lengths to which a result-oriented 
court will go to justify an improper result. First, the court maintained that following a procedure 
dictated by the Code created an ambiguity. Then, it said that a failure to obtain a form of assent first 
enunciated years later in this opinion, and reliance on continued dealing after a negotiation that 
failed to remove the clause, supports a conclusion that the seller did not "truly" mean what the 
grammar of the Code says the language meant. All of this is contra to the plain meaning of the rules 
in U.C.C. §§ 2-204 and 2-206 that make a contract on the terms of the offer if followed by 
acceptance of a shipment or other conduct indicating acceptance. 
112. The purpose of the unless clause in U.C.C. § 2-207(1) was to permit a seller to make a 
counteroffer if so desired, but the seller must do so explicitly. There is no indication that§ 2-207(1) 
purports to change basic counteroffer rules where the unless clause is used. For the proposition that 
common law rules prevail in the interstices of the Code, see G&R Corp. v. American Security & 
Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 33 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Goldstein v. 
S&A Restaurant Corp., 622 F. Supp. 139, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 81 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code."113 What then was the 
"mischief' that section 2-207 was designed to prevent? It was the unintended 
counteroffer effect under common law114 where a reply expressing acceptance 
had only minor differences from the offer; that is, suggestions or terms that in 
business dealings did not, and in business thinking ought not, result in a 
counteroffer, especially when the reply to the offer did not signal a counterof-
fer115 but contained a 'definite and seasonal expression of acceptance. 
The Diamond Fruit court seems to suggest that shipment of the tubing by the 
seller operated as a waiver of the condition altogether,116 unless there was an 
expressed definite assent to the term~ in the acknowledgment. 117 This is a new 
limit on the rules for the acceptance of offers found in the Code, which opt 
heavily in favor of acceptance by conduct.118 
Where the issue is the exclusion of consequential damages, one should not 
talk of placing the buyer in as good a position as it would have been in had the 
seller performed,119 without mentioning the immediately follo\Ying clause of 
section 1-106(1): "but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may 
be had except as specifically provided in this Act qr by other rule of law. "120 
Also not mentioned by the court were the provisions of U.C.C. section 
2-719(1)(a), expressly permitting a disclaimer of consequential damages, and 
section 2-719(3), indicating that where personal injuries are not involved, one 
claiming unconscionability would have to show that the exclusion was uncon-
scionable.121 If U.C.C. section 2-302 on that subject is the guide, then the 
plaintiff must overcome the comment's statement that H is not the purpose of the 
section to disturb the "allocation of risks because of superior bargaining 
113. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 2. The section itself does preclude a disclaimer of "the obligations 
of good faith diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act." Making a reply to an offer a 
counteroffer and disclaiming consequential damages does not violate any of the specified obligations. 
There are also specific exceptions to freedom of contract, as in U.C.C. § 9-501(3), and "fair 
reading" exceptions, such as oral waivers of the statute of frauds, none of which apply here. 
114. The object was merely to eliminate cases such as Poel v. Brunswick Balke Collender Co., 
216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915), where a clause asked for prompt acknowledgment of the 
acceptance. The so-called "mirror image" rule. 
115. Under the common law, an acceptance merely requesting a change was clearly not a 
counteroffer. Restate~ent (Second) of Contracts§ 61 (1981). U.C.C. § 2-207(1) and (2) seems to 
change the emphasis; the response is not a counteroffer unless the party says so by using the unless 
clause. 
116. Waiver coniemplates a relinquishment of a right by a person having at least reason to know 
that the right exists and is being relinquished. See Barliant v. Follet Corp., 138 Ill. App. 3d 756, 
483 N.E.2d 1312, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1206 (1985). Given seller's refusal to remove 
the clause, and U.C.C. §§ 2-204 and 2-206, it is sophistry to find a basis for imposing a greater 
liability than intended because the seller did not take "enforcement" procedures not required by the 
Code. 
117. 794 F.2d at 1445, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1080. 
118. See U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-206, 1-205, 2-207(3). 
119. See id.§ 1-106(1). 
120. Id.§ 1-106(1) (last lines). 
121. See id.§ 2-713 comment 3. 
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power."122 The effect of liability for consequential damages on pricing is well 
known. The Code appears to treat it as one of the risks to be allocated by 
agreement, both in U.C.C. section 2-719( l)(a)'s statement that the "agreement 
may provide" for exclusion of consequential damages, and in the reference to 
that statement in comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-715: "Any seller who does not 
wish to take the risk of consequential damages has available the section on 
contractual limitation of remedy." Finally in comment 5 to U.C.C. section 
2-207, among the examples of clauses that "involve no element of unreasonable 
surprise and which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice 
of objection is seasonably given, [is a clause] otherwise limiting remedy in a 
reasonable manner." 
Was the remedy here limited unreasonably and, thus, may the court have 
erroneously reached a proper result? By the terms of U.C.C. section 2-714, 
damages for breach of warranty are the difference "between the value of the 
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as 
warranted." We can assume that the value of tubing with a pinhole is zero, so 
that a refund of the purchase price is what should be awarded under the Code. 
Hence, the limitation is not unreasonable, as it follows the Code rule. 
Thus, the Code seems to consider that who pays consequential damages is a 
matter for contract allocation. A seller following the Code's provision on how to 
make it clear that the acknowledgment form is a counteroffer should not be 
forced to bear the risk of excludable consequential damages. This is especially 
true where the damages are for the benefit of a buyer who knew the exclusion 
was in the form and had not been successful in having it eliminated. 
The Ninth Circuit could have taken a second approach in most cases, 
although it would not have been appli'Cable in this case. This alternative flows 
from the fact, emphasized in Dean Murray's article, that a very large majority 
of purchasing agents do not read the conditions on the reverse sides of either 
their own or the other contracting parties' forms. 123 Hence, neither party's terms 
were called specifically to the attention of the other, including the unless 
clause.124 Thus, following a policy of implementing the intent of the parties, or 
that contractual relations are based on a meeting of the minds, the court could 
have applied U.C.C. section 2-207(3) as a fair resolution of the problem when 
the goods are shipped and accepted, and no terms mutually agreed upon apply 
to the problem. But this approach, too, should not be applied in favor of a party 
who had read the reverse of the other party's form and had unsuccessfully 
negotiated for removal of the exclusion of consequential damages, but who 
nonetheless continued to accept and pay for goods shipped afterwards under the 
same form. 126 
122. See id.§ 2-302 comment 1 (discussion following citation of Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 
172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948)). 
123. See Murray, supra note 97, at 1317-18 n.47 (referring to the practices of some 5,000 
purchasing agents}. 
124. The "not called to the attention" technique is usually reserved for nonreading consumers. 
125. Instead of a nonreader, the case involves a post-reading negotiator. 
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Of course, the Code could have provided that the front of the form, to be 
effective, must have a conspicuous reference to the fact that disclaimers of 
warranties and of consequential damages were on the reverse side,126 or that the 
unless clause, to be effective, should be conspicuously stated above the signature 
on the face of any acknowledgment. 127 But the Code did not take this route. Nor 
did it specify that acceptances of counteroffers were to be made in any way 
different from acceptances of offers. Judicial decision is not an appropriate way 
to amend Code text. Nor should a court, in effect, find waivers of the unless 
clause that are not knowingly made with intent to waive. 128 
In contrast to the analysis of prior dealing in Diamond Fruit, an Illinois 
appellate court in Barliant v. Follett Corp. 129 was faced with an invoice, issued 
under an agreement for a sale of books F.O.B. seller's warehouse, Chicago, 
adding charges for book post, transportation, and insurance. The court held that 
under U.C.C. section 2-207(2) these terms were not material alterations to the 
contract. The contract documents were, according to buyer-Barliant, the seller's 
terms of sale in its catalogue and Barliant's order, including reimbursement of 
the cost of transportation from the warehouse to the plaintiff's retail stores. The 
suit claimed that the charges added were in excess of the costs to be reimbursed. 
For more than eighteen months the added charges were paid in full on 
twenty-four invoices by Barliant, an attorney, who testified that as a matter of 
general management he examined invoices and packing slips before making 
payment. 130 The trial court found "incredible" his testimony that he had not 
noticed the increased nature of the charges, and it also ruled that he had 
accepted them by a course of dealing. 131 It is not clear from the opinion whether 
the invoices were treated as acceptances or whether the catalogue's terms were 
such that the order was the acceptance. In any event, there was no need to rule 
on the material alteration point. As proposals for addition to the contract, or as 
modifications under U.C.C. section 2-209, they were accepted by a course of 
dealing based on a reason to know. 132 
Mace Industries v. Paddock Pool Equipment Co. 133 suggested a better ap-
proach in some ways but went too far in others. The court indicated that for a 
return form to constitute a counteroffer, "the conditional nature of the accep-
126. It may be difficult to see why disclaimers of warranties require type that is conspicuous and 
the use of the word merchantability, when limitations of damages do not. Yet, the plain meaning of 
the Code's language makes this distinction, perhaps because the latter limitations so often occur. 
Also, in comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-207, a reasonable limitation of damages is an example of a 
nonmaterial term. Yet, a refund of the cost of a piece of tubing seems quite immaterial as compared 
with damages to the fruit in a wholesale cooler, but courts should not reverse legislative decisions 
plainly enacted. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26 (Kansas rule on signatures). 
128. See supra note 116. 
129. 138 Ill. App. 3d 756, 483 N.E.2d 1312, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1206. 
130. Id. at 761, 483 N.E.2d at 1316, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1211. 
131. Id. at 759, 761, 483 N.E.2d at 1314, 1317, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1_209, 1211. 
132. See V.C.C. § 1-205. 
133. 288 S.C. 62, 339 S.E.2d 527, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 825 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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tance must be clearly expressed in a manner sufficient to notify the offeror that 
the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless the additional or 
different terms are included in the contract."134 The difficulty is how to charac-
terize the so-called "purchase order" containing no reference to warranties sent 
in response to a "quotation" document called a "sales agreement" containing a 
limited warranty and which was referred to in the purchase order. 
The sender of the purchase order argued that it was a counteroffer accepted 
by an acknowledgment that (i) did not limit warranties (thereby accepting all of 
its terms and implications) and (ii) objected to only two of the conditions on the 
purchase order. 135 This characterization of the purchase order as a counteroffer 
was based on a statement on the reverse of the form, "THE SELLER 
AGREES TO ALL OF THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDI-
TIONS,'' and on a provision that the terms constituted the entire agreement of 
the parties. The court ruled that, despite the objection of Mace to two of the 
purchase order terms, Paddock was willing to go through with the agreement, 
and that this demonstrated "that Paddock was willing to proceed with the 
purchase of the equipment even though Mace did not assent to all the terms" of 
the purchase order. 136 Even if correct, does not this reasoning demonstrate 
treatment of the purchase order as an acceptance and not a counteroffer? This 
treatment is probably correct since the expression of acceptance in the purchase 
order, if there was one, was not expressly conditioned on a seller's agreement to 
its terms. 
Then, the court treated Paddock as accepting Mace's limited warranty, which 
was only stated in the quotation sales agreement. If the purchase order was an 
offer, did not the "conspicuous" language satisfy U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a) 
and negate any terms in the seller's acceptance that were different or additional 
to the offer? 137 The reference to the prior proposed sales agreement could have 
been considered as an ambiguity resolved against the sender of the order. 
It seems odd that where nothing about a warranty is stated in a purchase 
order, or nothing as to exclusion of consequential damages, the provisions of the 
Code are incorporated as objections to a reply, but when not stated in an 
acceptance, the terms are not effective as objections to a limited warranty in the 
offering documents. 
Equally, it seems that in Diamond Fruit something more than proceeding 
with the deal was needed for assent to a counteroffer, but in Mace, proceeding 
with a deal was sufficient to constitute a withdrawal of a counteroffer. 
Dean Murray is right. There is chaos in the battle of the forms. Perhaps the 
Permanent Editorial Board for the Code should reconsider whether U.C.C. 
section 2-207 provides the appropriate results intended. 
134. Id. at--, 339 S.E.2d at 530, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 828-29. 
135. Id. at __ , 339 S.E.2d at 530, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 827. 
136. Id. at __ , 339 S.E.2d at 530, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 829. 
137. True, the language does not object to specific terms one by one. But is this required in an 
offer? Is the exact language of the unless clause necessary to create a counteroffer? 
Warranties 
General 
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Again, the litigation on warranty issues was mostly routine, although a few 
cases dealt with questions of interest. Several cases involving warranty issues 
arose out of the sale of used automobiles. In Crothers v. Cohen, 138 the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for Crothers based on a jury finding that 
Cohen breached an express warranty made by Cohen's agent to Crothers. After 
upholding the trial court's decision to submit the issue of the existence of an 
express warranty to the jury, the court of appeals, relying on a line of cases 
concluding that use of the word "good" created an express warranty, affirmed 
the jury's finding that the statement that a 1970 Dodge had a rebuilt carburetor 
and was a good runner was sufficient to create an express warranty, covering a 
stuck accelerator that caused the car to crash into a tree and injure the plaintiff. 
Yet, nowhere did the court explain just exactly how a warranty that a car is a 
good runner covered a stuck accelerator. However, there were jury findings that 
there was a breach, that the breach caused the accident, and that, in a 
comparative negligence state, the plaintiff was five percent at fault and the seller 
ninety-five percent. ' 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Bailey v. LeBeau,139 suspended its 
own rules of appellate procedure to prevent what it termed a "manifest 
injustice,"140 and created what the dissenting judge might have characterized as 
the same thing. In Bailey, the court reversed a judgment for plaintiff under the 
North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practice Act,141 trebling damages of $2,200 
and awarding attorneys' fees based on a warranty claim arising from the sale of 
a Honda Civic. The appellate court noted that the uncontroverted evidence was 
clearly sufficient to support a jury's finding (i) that the salesman's statement 
that certain engine parts had been replaced within the last six months consti-
tuted an express warranty and (ii) that this warranty had been breached. But 
the court remanded the case for a new trial, reasoning that there was no 
evidence that the breach of the warranty (that parts had actually been replaced 
about eighteen months before the sale instead of the six months warranted) 
caused the failure that occurred. 142 One judge dissented, noting that (i) plaintiff 
was assured that the car was suitable for effective and economical long-distance 
driving, (ii) plaintiff paid $1,400 for a car that would not run, (iii) title and 
possession of the auto was still in defendant, (iv) plaintiff was stranded 120 
miles from home and had to get back the best way he could, (v) plaintiff 
returned to get the car and tow it back, all at cost to himself, and (vi) plaintiff 
138. 384 N.W.2d 562, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
139. 79 N.C. App. 345, 339 S.E.2d 460, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 378 (1986). 
140. Id. at __ , 339 S.E.2d at 462, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 381. 
141. N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 75-1.1 (1977). Attorneys' fees could be awarded under id.§ 75-16.1. The 
basis was willfully engaging in the deceptive act (lying about how recently the act was done and that 
there was unwarranted refusal to resolve the matter). Plaintiff was "put off'' by claims of repair 
work for over 45 days while no work was being done. 
142. 79 N.C. App. at __ , 339 S.E.2d at 464, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 384. 
1236 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 42, August 1987 
was deprived of the use of the auto during a delay of eighteen months. Since the 
evidence established that plaintiff suffered out-of-pocket expenses, much incon-
venience, lost time, and $1,400 for the car, Judge Phillips felt that rather than 
waive rules for a deceptive defendant the law required that the judgment be 
affirmed. 143 
In Foley v. Dayton Bank & Trust, 144 the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
dismissed a claim for breach of express warranty arising out of the sale by the 
bank of a used truck it had repossessed. The court decided that a statement by a 
bank employee that to the best of his knowledge the truck was in good condition 
was merely an opinion that did not create an express warranty. Conversely, the 
New York Justice Court in Bernstein v. Sherman, 146 held that the statement by 
a private seller's mechanic that the frame of a Datsun 280Z that had recently 
been in an accident was in good condition, created an express warranty, "at 
least to the extent that the frame was in 'good condition,' " 146 even though the 
bill of sale contained an "as is" clause.147 
Two cases dealt with express warranties arising out of sales where the seller 
agreed to deliver goods in accordance with a buyer's required specifications. In 
the first, Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer lndustries, 148 a panel of the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for Northern States based on a claim of 
breach of an express warranty. The express warranty was found in the 
technical specifications created jointly by buyer and seller and in the statement 
in the proposal for a contract (that was accepted) that the items supplied would 
meet the contract specifications. 149 In the second case, Phillips Petroleum Co., 
Norway v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 160 the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a 
decision of the court of appeals and reinstated a verdict for Phillips Petroleum 
for in excess of $1,600,000 for breach of an express warranty on reasons 
different than those of the trial court. Here, the court found that an express 
warranty had been created where Bucyrus-Erie's confirmation of a modification 
in effect certified that crane pedestal adapters would be made of a specified 
143. Id. at --· 339 S.E.2d at 464-66, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d. at 384-87 (Phillips, J., 
dissenting). 
144. 696 S.W.2d 356, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). 
145. 130 Misc. 2d 741, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 375 (Just. Ct. 
1986). 
146. Id. at 743, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 300, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 377. See also Redmac, Inc. v. 
Computerland of Peoria, 140 Ill. App. 3d 741, 489 N.E.2d 380, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1242 ( 1985) (court affirmed an award for breach of an express warranty for Redman who relied on 
statements that a computer system would be free of defects and would work for a reasonable period 
of time; the computer never worked). 
147. As to the consistency between the mechanic's statement and the as is clause, the court found 
they were not necessarily inconsistent, and alternatively, that the "as is" disclaimer was invalid as 
against public policy since the defect caused an accident from which the plaintiff was fortunate to 
escape without serious personal injury. 130 Misc. 2d at 743, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 301, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d at 378. See also infra text accompanying note 156. 
148. 777 F.2d 405, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1 (8th Cir. 1985). 
149. See discussion of Northern States Power Co. infra text accompanying note 158. 
150. 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 667 (1986). 
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grade of steel as required by Phillips's specifications. This warranty was 
breached when that grade of steel was inadvertently not used. 151 
The question of whether reliance on an express warranty is a prerequisite for 
a claim of breach was examined in several cases. In Keith v. Buchanan,152 a 
California appellate court reversed a judgment for defendant, rendered at the 
close of plaintiff's case, where the buyer did not show any reliance on affirma-
tions made in an advertising brochure disseminated to the public in order to 
induce sales of an oceangoing yacht. In reversing the judgment for defendant, 
the court held that actual reliance on the seller's factual representations in 
advertising brochures need not be shown under section 2-313 of the California 
Commercial Code. Rather, the seller must show that the representations formed 
no part of the bargain. 153 In Global Truck and Equipment Co. v. Palmer 
Machine Works,1 54 a federal court in the Northern District of Mississippi 
denied recovery for breach of an express warranty arising out of the sale of 
dump trucks by Palmer to Global, where Global failed to prove that statements 
contained in the Palmer brochure were relied upon or induced the sale prior to 
or contemporaneously with the making of the contract, 155 an approach directly 
contra to that used in Keith. 
Disclaimers and Limited Remedies 
In Bernstein v. Sherman, 156 as discussed previously, the court held that a 
written disclaimer in the form of an "as is" clause in a bill of sale was not 
inconsistent with the seller's mechanic's statement that the frame of an automo-
bile was in good condition. Alternatively, the court, upon the assumption of an 
inconsistency, held the as is disclaimer invalid as contrary to public policy where 
the defect had the potential to cause serious bodily injury. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, in Phillips Petroleum Co., Norway v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,157 held 
that a limited remedy for replacement of defective crane pedestal adapters failed 
to make the injured party whole where the damages provided for were uncon-
scionably low. Evidence established damages in excess of $1,600,000 and the 
limited remedy provisions would have put a ceiling on plaintiff's damages at 
$10,400. 
151. See discussion of Phillips Petroleum infra text accompanying note 157. 
152. 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 386 (1985). 
153. The fact that the buyer had several boat builders inspect the yacht before purchasing it did 
not negate the "basis of the bargain" requirement, but it did negate the reliance element a plaintiff 
must show when claiming breach of a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
154. 628 F. Supp. 641, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1250. 
155. See Khan v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W.2d 310, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
1114 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (reliance is not a necessary element of a claim for breach of the implied 
warranties of U.C.C. § 2-314 or§ 2-315). See also Bernstein v. Sherman, 130 Misc. 2d at 742, 497 
N.Y.S.2d at 300, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 377; Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 
777 F.2d at 412, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 11. 
156. 130 Misc. 2d 741, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 375. 
157. 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 667. 
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Finally, in Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Industries, 158 a panel of 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed a decision of the district court holding that the 
contractual disclaimer of warranties and limitation of remedies were inconsis-
tent with an express warranty arising out of the acceptance of Northern States's 
technical specifications. The court concluded that the disclaimers written in the 
contract do not apply to a breach of the warranty of compliance with the 
specifications. In particular, the court declined to rule that, as a matter of law, 
the limited remedy in a separate paragraph referring to the warranties in that 
paragraph was the sole remedy under the contract for breach of the express 
warranty pertaining to the specifications. 
Third-Party Beneficiaries 
In Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 159 a Pennsylvania court applied alterna-
tive A to U.C.C. section 2-318 to deny standing to a widow who inherited a car 
bought by her late husband and attempted to sue for damages (not involving 
personal injury) as a third-party beneficiary. The court reasoned that section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was also inapplicable as the loss was 
economic. 
On the other hand, where vertical privity was concerned, the purchaser of a 
warehouse who, by virtue of an assignment clause in the purchase contract, 
succeeded to the buyer's rights, was able to defeat defendant's motions for 
summary judgment in Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp. 160 Although the 
twenty-year roofing bond had expired, summary judgment could not be granted 
because a question of fact existed as to whether the representations made in 
connection with the roofing bond "were warranties extending to future perfor-
mance."161 
Notice of Breach to Remote Sellers or Manufacturers 
Section 2-607(3 )(a) requires a buyer to give a seller notice of breach within a 
reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach. 
Failure to give the specified notice bars a buyer from any remedy for breach. 
The case law has not been uniform in its application of this section to remote 
sellers and manufacturers. Some decisions have limited the section to require the 
buyer to notify only his immediate seller of any breach. 162 These decisions allow 
a buyer, who has given the necessary notice of breach to his immediate seller, to 
then seek relief from remote sellers and manufacturers up the distribution chain 
who may not receive any notice of the alleged breach until litigation begins. 
158. 777 F.2d 405, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1. 
159. 349 Pa. Super. 147, 502 A.2d 1317, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 851 (1986). 
160. 503 A.2d 646, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 462 (Del. Super. 1985). 
161. Id. at 656, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 471. 
162. See, e.g., Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Sup. 219, 217 A.2d 71, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 147 (1965); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129, 
2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 611 (1965). 
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However, a recent case illustrates the apparent trend toward a more expansive 
interpretation of the section that requires a buyer to notify all sellers or 
manufacturers in the distribution chain of any breach for which the buyer may 
seek relief. 
In Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park,163 the Texas Court of Appeals held 
that a buyer must notify a remote manufacturer of any breach in order to 
recover. At trial, the jury found that the "sealer-type casket" that the manufac-
turer produced and sold to plaintiff's immediate vendor was unfit for its 
ordinary purposes. The jury also specifically found that plaintiff had failed to 
notify the manufacturer of the casket's unfit condition within a reasonable time. 
The appellate court reasoned that the purpose of the mandated notice-to 
afford an opportunity to inspect the goods and cure a breach-was as applicable 
to remote sellers and manufacturers as to the buyer's immediate seller. 164 
While the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the court of appeals 
in Wilcox in a per curiam opinion,165 it specifically refused to consider whether 
the notice requirement of section 2-607(3 )(a) applies to remote sellers and 
manufacturers, thereby contributing to the uncertainty surrounding this issue. 
The court of appeals decision in Wilcox is a reminder, though, that buyers 
cannot assume that their immediate sellers will bear the buyers' burden of 




The Third Circuit recently considered whether New Jersey would adopt the 
subjective "pure heart and empty head" standard for determining good faith 
purchaser status in Johnson b Johnson Products v. Dal International Trading 
Co. 166 In that case, operating subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson obtained a 
preliminary injunction as part of an effort to bar the distribution of Johnson & 
Johnson products after the goods had worked their way into the so-called "gray 
market."167 Although the route by which the goods came into the hands of 
defendant, Quality King, was unclear, their journey began when Dal Interna-
tional Trading Co., an instrumentality of the Polish government, acquired them 
from Johnson & Johnson, Ltd., a British corporation. According to the plain-
tiffs, J & J, Ltd. sold to Dal only because of Dal's fraudulent representation that 
the goods would be distributed solely in Poland. 168 The district court believed 
163. 696 S.W.2d 423, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 169 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). 
164. Id. at 424, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 170-71. 
165. 701 S.W.2d 842, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1303 (Tex. 1986). 
166. 798 F.2d 100, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1082 (3d Cir. 1986). 
167. As described by the court, the gray market is "where imported products are sold in the 
United States outside the manufacturer's distribution system, often contrary to the wishes of the 
manufacturer." Id. at 101, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1083. 
168. Because the contract was fraudulently induced, the court correctly assumed that Dal 
obtained voidable title. 
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that Quality King was not a good faith purchaser under U.C.C. sections 
2-403(1) and 2-103( 1) and, hence, acquired only the voidable title of Dal. 169 
The court's conclusion was premised on its finding that the transaction was 
conducted under "suspicious circumstances" that "cried out for inquiry."170 
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that whether Quality King was honest 
in fact is to be determined by what it actually knew or suspected, not by what an 
investigation into the facts would have arguably disclosed. 171 Stating that the 
purpose of the good faith purchaser doctrine is the promotion of commerce by 
the reduction of transaction costs, the court thought the doctrine would be ill-
served by the imposition on a purchaser of a duty to investigate the conditions 
surrounding its transferor's acquisition. 
Title and Entrusting 
Executive Financial Services v. Pagel112 raised the question of whether a 
buyer who does not take free of an existing security interest under U.C.C. 
section 9-307(1 )173 nevertheless can rely on the entrustment theory of U.C.C. 
section 2-403(2)174 to render his interest superior to that of the secured creditor. 
In Pagel, the secured creditor purchased several tractors from a John Deere 
dealership, then "leased"176 the tractors to a partnership consisting of the two 
principals of the dealership. The secured creditor expected that the partnership 
would sublease the tractors to farmers, but instead, the tractors, which never left 
the dealership's lot, were sold by the dealership in the ordinary course of its 
business. Because the security interest was not created by the dealership, the 
buyers did not qualify for the preferred treatment of U.C.C. section 9-307(1 ). 176 
If their interest was protected, it could only be because of U.C.C. section 2-
169. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1 ): "A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or 
had power to transfer .... A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good 
faith purchaser for value." 
170. 798 F.2d at 103, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1085 (citing district court opinion). 
171. Although good faith on the part of a merchant requires both "honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade," U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b), 
only the first part of the definition received the court's attention. The district court did not find, nor 
did the plaintiffs produce, evidence that it was the practice in the gray market to investigate the 
chain of title. 798 F.2d at 106 n.4, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1090 n.4. Nor was there any 
discussion of whether the failure to investigate was based on fear of what would be found, thus 
negating good faith. 
172. 238 Kan. 809, 715 P.2d 381, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1185 (1986). 
173. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) allows a buyer in the ordinary course of business to take free of a 
security interest created by his seller. 
174. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who 
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in 
ordinary course of business." 
175. Although the transaction was denominated by the parties as a lease, the court found that it 
was actually a sale and the creation of a security interest. 
176. It could possibly have been argued that the dealership was the alter ego or agent of the 
partnership, thus making U.C.C. § 9-307(1) applicable. 
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403(2). Adopting the view of Professor Barkley Clark,177 the Kansas Supreme 
Court held that the resolution of priority disputes between secured creditors and 
subsequent buyers is not the exclusive domain of article 9. Where, as in this 
case, the secured creditor is the actual entruster, its rights as such are tra:is-
ferred to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
Although comment 2 to U.C.C. section 2-403 suggests that goods must 
become part of a merchant's inventory before there can be an entrustment, it 
does not follow that physical possession by the merchant is needed. Schneider v. 
J. W. Metz Lumber Co. 11s involved the sale of prefabricated log cabin kits. The 
lumber was provided by a wholesale lumber company and delivered directly to 
the buyers of the kits. However, it was the log cabin company that was solely 
responsible for paying the wholesaler. When the log cabin company filed for 
bankruptcy without having paid the wholesaler, the wholesaler sought recovery 
from the buyers. In reversing both the trial and intermediate appellate courts, 
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the effect of the wholesaler's delivery to 
the buyers was an entrustment to the Jog cabin company.179 As a result, the 
buyers had no difficulty qualifying for buyer in ordinary course treatment under 
U.C.C. section 2-403(2). 
Tender, Cure, and Notice 
Few cases of any interest were decided on the issue of tender. 1so In one 
involving the running of a bankruptcy time period (now repealed), the court 
held that the period started when delivery was tendered. 1s1 But, as the court 
said, the repeal of the section made its holding of little precedential value. 1s2 
Seller's right to cure a defective tender arose in a revocation of acceptance 
case,1s3 which did not discuss or mention the recently adopted "lemon law."1s• 
Whether the car was a new car (it was a "demonstrator" with 2,915 miles on it) 
was not an issue, since the Renault was sold with the AMC limited new car 
warranty. Also, unlike the "same defect" three times requirement in the lemon 
laws, many of the numerous returns were for more than ten different defects, 
with one return requiring a wait of twenty-two days for parts. The trial judge 
177. B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code§ 3.4[3) 
(1987 Cum. Supp. No. 1 ). The act of entrustment was the secured creditor's acquiescence in what it 
believed would be the temporary retention of possession of the tractors by the dealership. See U.C.C. 
§ 2-403(3). 
178. 715 P.2d 329, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1648 (Colo. 1986). 
179. Id. at 333, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1651. 
180. One case is discussed infra notes 194-198 and accompanying text. 
181. Production Steel, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 54 Bankr. 417, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1285 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985). 
182. Id. at 419 n.1, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1289 n.1. The 45-day period in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(c)(2)(B) (1982) had been eliminated by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 355, 378. 
183. Rester v. Morrow, 491 So. 2d 204, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 751 (Miss. 1986). 
184. The Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, Miss. Code Ann.§§ 63-17-151 to 63-17-
165 (Supp. 1986) (effective July 1, 1985). 
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granted the dealer's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the buyer 
had not shown that any substantial defects remained unrepaired. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded by a vote of six to one. Accepting 
the subjective standard to determine "the unique circumstances of the buyer" 
but placing a reasonable man in those circumstances, the court ruled that "our 
law does not allow a seller to postpone revocation in perpetuity by fixing 
everything that goes wrong with the automobile."185 At the final rejection, the 
buyer referred to three minor defects that were still unrepaired. 186 But the court 
said that emphasis on these defects only concentrated on the "straw [that broke] 
the camel's back. In our view, the whole camel-including its performance over 
the five month period [of plaintiff's] use of the Renault-is relevant to the 
question of whether [plaintiff] had a right to revoke." 167 The dissenting judge 
did not enter an opinion, stating in a footnote that the case "has been in the 
bosom of this court far too long."166 
Tr/:r S Brass r/:r Bronze Works v. Pie-Air, Inc. 169 involved an installment sale 
of door handles made with tooling supplied by buyer and a defective third 
installment that was rejected for nonconformity. Buyer did not return the goods 
after rejection but was entitled to keep the goods until it was paid the cost of 
inspecting and sorting the conforming from the defective products. 190 The 
handles were made available at buyer's facility, constituting no acceptance or 
waiver of the right to reject. Seller refused to acknowledge responsibility to cure 
until past the time for performance. This not only Jost seller the right to cure 
but also rendered seller liable in conversion for failure to return the tooling on 
demand. The buyer's acceptance of the first two shipments was asserted as the 
basis for seller's belief that the third installment was acceptable and that seller 
had a further reasonable time to cure. The failure to give any notice of intent to 
cure forfeited the reasonable time and the failure to give notice of intent to cure 
destroyed the defense to conversion of the tooling as no notice was given by the 
bailee that retention after a demand for return was to enable fulfillment of the 
purpose of the bailment. 191 
Two cases, however, protect the seller's right to cure. Where the buyer failed 
to state particular defects and refused to permit seller to inspect the defective 
185. 491 So. 2d at 210, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 759. 
186. These were soiled carpet (from water leaking on it), a fallen fuse panel, and a missing piece 
of chrome. Id. at 208, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 759. 
187. Id. at 210, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 760. 
188. Id. at 212 n.1, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 762 n.1 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The car was 
purchased in April 1981 and the opinion remanding for a new trial on all issues was rendered in 
June 1986. Justice delayed is justice denied. 
189. 790 F.2d 1098, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 433 (4th Cir. 1986). 
190. U.C.C. § 2-603( 1 ), requiring a rejecting buyer to follow reasonable instructions, is subject 
to U.C.C. § 2-711(3), giving the buyer a security interest in the rightfully rejected goods for 
payments made and expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care, 
and custody. 
191. 790 F.2d at 1106, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 444. Under neither the common law of 
bailments nor the U.C.C., had Pie-Air shown a right to retain the tooling. 
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goods, buyer was not allowed to rely on these defects as a defense to a suit for 
the purchase price. 192 The court based its denial on U.C.C. section 2-605, which 
has three bases for precluding the assertion of unstated defects. The first is that 
the defects must be ascertainable by reasonable inspection. The second and third 
are in the alternative (but one must be shown), either that the defect could have 
been cured, as in the case under discussion, or (as between merchants) that a 
written demand for a full and final inspection has been made and is answered. 
The second case involved a rejection of one installment of concrete sewer pipe 
for failure to meet buyer's specifications.193 There was a prompt shipment of 
cure with fully complying pipe. Buyer attempted to cancel the entire contract 
since the supplier also had been obliged to cure prior defective shipments. The 
buyer also attempted to recover for excess costs in ordering cover. Because the 
supplier covered promptly and within the time for delivery of each installment, 
the court refused a subjective test for "substantial impairment" under U.C.C. 
section 2-612(2) and reversed the judgment below, which had awarded the 
buyer the costs of cover. 
Risk of Loss 
Only one case discussed risk of loss as a major issue. In Ladex Corp. v. 
Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A.,194 frozen shrimp was to be sold by a 
Honduras company to Ladex in Miami. The shrimp arrived at Miami Interna-
tional Airport and were turned over to a trucking firm for delivery to Ladex's 
warehouse. The court then observed that "although the facts are somewhat 
sketchy on the record before us, we perceive that the truck containing the 
shipment of shrimp was hijacked while still in the loading area of the air-
port. "195 Suit was brought by Aetna Insurance Company (as subrogee of Ladex) 
for common law conversion against the carriers. The carriers contended that 
since Ladex had never paid for the shrimp, it had suffered no loss. On this basis, 
the trial court entered a final summary judgment for the carriers. 
A Florida appellate court reversed on the ground that the all-important issue 
was whether Ladex had title to the shrimp at the time they were hijacked. 196 
Thus, despite the rule of U.C.C. section 2-401-that the provisions of the Code 
apply irrespective of title to the goods-courts still are swayed by concepts of 
title. The real problem was, when did risk of loss pass to the buyer? This was 
governed by U.C.C. section 2-509(1) and depended on whether the contract was 
a shipment contract or a destination contract-without regard to title. Carrier 
liability for common law conversion may still depend on title, however. 
192. A.F.L. Falck, S.p.A. v. E.A. Karay Co., 639 F. Supp. 314, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
193. Bodine Sewer, Inc. v. Eastern Ill. Precast, Inc., 143 Ill. App. 3d 920, 493 N.E.2d 705, 1 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1480 (1986). 
194. 476 So. 2d 763, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
195. Id. at 764, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 134. 
196. Id. at 764, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 135. 
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The court correctly ruled that the fact that Ladex had not paid for the goods, 
if title had passed, was not an issue available to the carriers in a common law 
conversion action under U.C.C. section 1-103. Yet, the court noted that if the 
action had been for nondelivery by the consignee of a nonnegotiable bill, U.C.C. 
section 7-301 would limit recovery to one who has paid value. 197 In dicta, which 
may be the law of the case, the court stated that a contract C.l.F. or C & F is a 
shipment contract on the normal contract terms that are so well known that any 
variation using those letters should be read as a shipment contract, if reasonably 
possible. A destination contract was the variant contract and must be expressly 
agreed upon by the parties. 198 But since the record was not fully developed on 
the type of contract (again referred to in the context of determining who had 
title as a matter of law), the case was remanded for further proceedings. 
The court does not make clear who had rights of recovery if title passes 
contractually under U.C.C. section 2-401 at a different time from the risk of 
loss under U.C.C. section 2-509( 1 ). 
Repudiation 
Despite the fact that the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation is well over a 
hundred years old, courts appear reluctant to permit suit on that basis without a 
very clear refusal by a party to perform. Hence, to obtain a clear repudiation, 
use is made of the demand for assurances in U.C.C. section 2-609(1 ). But its 
requirements that the demand be in writing, be based on reasonable grounds for 
insecurity, and be for "adequate" assurances only create issues as to whether the 
failure to reply, or what is offered in reply, really triggers a repudiation. 
Seldom are the facts as clear as those before the court in BarclaysAmerican/ 
Business Credit v. E & E Enterprises. 199 On July 16, 1982, a seller of wood 
products informed the buyer /cabinet maker that it was closing its plant that day 
and would not deliver under two purchase orders for delivery in July and 
August. The seller added that the only way to receive the deliveries was to talk 
to the vice president of Barclays, which was the company financing seller's 
receivables. Despite the reference to a way of receiving delivery, the court ruled 
that July 16, 1982 was the date of the repudiation. The date of the repudiation 
was important as buyer was claiming that its damages for the repudiation could 
be set off against some $76,105 it owed seller on prior contracts. Buyer received 
notice of the assignment of the accounts receivable to Barclays on July 28, 
1982.200 Had the buyer used a U.C.C. section 2-609 demand on July 16, 1982, 
197. U .C.C. § 7-301 ( 1) states: "A consignee of a non-negotiable bill who has given value in good 
faith ... may recover from the issuer damages caused by ... non-receipt ... of the goods." This 
section contains an exception not significant in the case being discussed. The implication is: no value 
given, no recovery. But, if risk of loss passes, the contractual obligation to pay becomes fixed and so 
would be value. 
198. 476 So. 2d at 765, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 135-36. 
199. 697 S.W.2d 694, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 706 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
200. This was by letter. 697 S.W.2d at 696, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 709. The court said that 
the primary issue was whether the buyer's setoff was good against the assignee of the wood products 
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thirty days would not have expired until August 15, 1982, and the repudiation 
and consequent setoff would not have occurred before receipt of the notice of the 
assignment. Thus, the appellate court found no error in the trial court's finding. 
Indeed, in a footnote, 201 the court said that even if the statement about talking 
to the vice president was notice of an assignment, it came after the statement 
that the plant was closed. Hence, the repudiation would still have occurred 
before the account debtor received notice of the assignment. 
Interestingly, the court relied on the timing of the repudiation as a breach and 
did not rule on the effect of a promise, stipulated to have been made, to give the 
buyer sixty days notice before shutting down the plant, which also occurred on 
the same day as the conversation about no more deliveries. 202 
In T& S Brass & Bronze Works v. Pie-Air, Jnc.,2°3 fortunately no great issue 
hung on when breach occurred. Pie-Air was the seller in a case involving the 
third delivery of allegedly nonconforming goods under an installment contract. 
Pie-Air attempted to claim buyer's repudiation by reason of a letter that 
summarized a conference three days before and said that "we [T & SJ would be 
happy to take the parts provided they passed inspection" and added that 
"'T&S' could not make any further payments to Pie-Air until such time as this 
entire matter is cleared-up." The court upheld (as not clearly erroneous) the 
magistrate's conclusion that these sentences, in context, constituted only a 
demand for assurances. 204 Thus, factual issues seem inevitable in anticipatory 
repudiation cases. 
Impossibility and Frustration 
There was both good news and bad news this year for those seeking excuse 
based on impracticability under U.C.C. section 2-615. 
First the good news. Two cases excused sellers under U.C.C. section 2-615. 
In Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Engineers, 205 the mechanical subcontractor 
(Waldinger) on a water treatment facility construction project sued its supplier 
of sludge dewatering equipment (Ashbrook) for breach of contract. Ashbrook 
company's receivables, i.e., that the right to set off "ripened" before receipt of notice of the 
assignment. Cf U.C.C. § 9-318. 
201. 697 S.W.2d at 700 n.3, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 714 n.3. 
202. Barclays, on appeal, argued that the 60-day notice promise did not constitute a contract 
because there was no consideration to support the promise. Thus, by finding it unnecessary to decide 
whether the evidence supported the trial court's findings, the court chose to prefer an anticipatory 
repudiation over a present breach to support its affirmance. 
203. 790 F.2d 1098, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 433. 
204. Id. at 1194, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 441. Universal Builders Corp. v. United Methodist 
Convalescent Homes, 7 Conn. App. 318, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 763 (1986), is a 
similar case. Roof trusses were to be supplied on a continuous basis. When deliveries were slow, 
buyer wrote the seller saying, among other things, "Unless a minimum of 200 trusses are delivered 
by July 5, 1983, you may consider your order cancelled." Id. at __ , 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 
765. The court interpreted this not as a repudiation, but as a request for assurances. By not giving 
such assurances, the seller repudiated, but at a date 30 days later. 
205. 775 F.2d 781, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 172 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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defended on the ground that its performance had been made impracticable by 
the project engineer's arbitrary interpretation of the contract specifications. 
Waldinger also sued the project engineer. Before Ashbrook bid on the project, it 
knew that the project engineer might not approve the machine it intended to 
use. Ashbrook also signed a purchase order prepared by Waldinger stating that 
the machine would be subject to the project engineer's approval and that the 
machine would be "in strict accordance" with the specifications. When Ash-
brook failed to perform, Waldinger had to cover at an additional cost of about 
$370,000. At trial, Waldinger prevailed against the project engineer, but Ash-
brook was excused for impracticability. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
on the impracticability question (Judge Pell dissenting) and remanded the 
question of the project engineer's liability for reconsideration in light of case law 
decided after the trial court's judgment. Perhaps the decision on the impractica-
bility question can be explained upon the ground that on remand Waldinger 
will almost certainly recover damages from the project engineer. 
The second case is Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada) 
Ltd. 206 Here the parties, both international dealers in agricultural commodities, 
made three contracts for fixed quantities of "1980 crop U.S. runner split 
peanuts." The seller (Gibbs) was unable to perform fully because extensive 
drought in the peanut growing areas had reduced the crop. The seller prorated 
and eventually delivered eighty-seven percent of the contract quantity. It would 
have cost the seller $3.8 million to purchase peanuts to fulfill the remainder of 
its obligations under the contracts; yet, seller's net worth was only $2.4 million. 
Further, the seller had anticipated a profit of only $18,000 on the Alimenta 
contracts. On these facts, the trial court excused the seller under U.C.C. section 
2-615. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. This court (and the parties) 
appear to have treated the contract as one stipulating an agreed source ("1980 
crop U.S. runner split peanuts") that had partially failed, thus, permitting the 
seller to allocate. 207 
In two cases, buyers sought excuse from long-term installment contracts that 
had become burdensome because of changed circumstances. In both cases, the 
courts refused to excuse. The first case was Northern Indiana Public Service Co. 
v. Carbon County Coal Co. 208 In 1978, when oil prices were high, a utility 
company entered into a twenty-year contract for 1.5 million tons of coal per 
year. The price was fixed subject to escalation. The court noted that the utility 
company entered into a contract fixed as to both quantity and price rather than 
a requirements contract because it was eager to have an assured source of low-
sulphur coal. With falling oil prices in the early 1980s, the contract had become 
206. 802 F.2d 1362, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 490 (11th Cir. 1986). 
207. Another case involving the failure of an agreed source of supply was Selland Pon-
tiac-GMC, Inc. v. King, 384 N.W.2d 490, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 463 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986) (seller excused under U.C.C. § 2-615 from performance of contract for sale of school 
bus bodies that seller was to obtain from specified manufacturer, who subsequently went out of 
business). 
208. 799 F.2d 265, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1505 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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expensive relative to the utility company's other alternatives for obtaining 
electricity. The Indiana Public Service Commission, which regulated the utility 
company's rates, declined to permit the utility company to continue to pass that 
expense on to its customers. The utility company then ceased to purchase coal 
under the contract. The seller obtained a preliminary injunction requiring the 
utility company to continue buying coal. After a jury trial, the seller won a 
judgment of $181 million. On appeal, Judge Posner, writing for the court, 
affirmed the trial finding that the utility was not excused from its obligations 
under the contract. 
In the second case, Scullin Steel Co. v. Paccar, /nc.,209 the buyer sought excuse 
from its obligations under a two-year (later extended to four-year) contract to 
purchase a fixed monthly quantity of railroad "car sets" because the buyer's 
market for railroad cars had evaporated. The trial court refused to excuse the 
buyer. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. This case is a good 
example of explicit risk allocation. The appellate court stressed that the seller 
wanted (as the buyer knew) a long-term contract in which the buyer guaranteed 
to take delivery so that the seller could obtain financing to make capital 
improvements to its plant. Thus, the seller proposed a contract stipulating that 
it could not be cancelled by either side. The buyer responded with a clause 
permitting it to withdraw from the contract should it cease manufacturing rail 
cars, but the seller refused to agree to such a clause. Eventually, the buyer 
signed the contract with the noncancellation clause. Under the circumstances, it 
is apparent that the buyer assumed the risk that its market might disappear. 210 
REMEDIES 
Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance 
Central to a buyer's right of rejection or revocation of acceptance is the 
statutory mandate that the relevant intention must be communicated to the 
seller. 211 Oda Nursery v. Garcia Tree & Lawn, /nc. 212 provides a lesson on the 
need to make explicit that the goods are no longer wanted. That case involved 
the purchase of spreading juniper plants. Following their receipt by the buyer, 
the plants were inspected but were not removed from their shipping containers 
until planted some four months later. When sued for the purchase price, the 
buyer argued that the plants were root-bound and had been rejected shortly 
after delivery. Relying on the testimony of one of the buyer's employees that she 
had immediately notified the seller that the plants did not look "up to snuff," 
the trial judge found a timely and effective rejection. 
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed. The court felt that the 
statement of the employee was insufficient to put the seller on notice that the 
209. 708 S.W.2d 756, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
210. The court also addressed an issue concerning computation of the seller's lost profits under 
u.c.c. § 2-708(2). 
211. See U.C.C. §§ 2-602, 2-608. 
212. 103 N.M. 438, 708 P.2d 1039, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 163 (1985). 
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plants were being rejected or that their acceptance was being revoked. 213 
Furthermore, the court found the notice lacking under U.C.C. section 2-605 
because the employee did not mention the plants' deteriorating or root-bound 
condition. 
The result is correct but the court's reference to section 2-605 is puzzling. 
Because notice to the seller of a breach is required even if the buyer wishes to 
retain the goods,214 it is logical to impose on the buyer a further obligation to let 
the seller know if the goods are not wanted. In the absence of a request by the 
seller, however, specificity of defects is needed only to enable the seller to 
exercise its right of cure.215 Nowhere in its opinion does the court explain its 
apparent assumption that that right existed. 
On the subject of notice, uncertainty exists as to whether it must be given in 
writing to be effective. Although the Code's definition of notice216 would seem to 
allow oral notice and nothing in article 2 suggests otherwise, some courts have 
held that a written communication is essential.217 
Reclamation 
The intermesh of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)218 and state law continues 
to be the subject of frequent litigation. Consider, for example, the recurring 
efforts of unpaid sellers to reclaim goods that are subject to the lien of a secured 
party who financed the inventory of the debtor. The vast majority of courts hold 
that the unpaid seller's right of reclamation under U.C.C. section 2-702 is 
subordinate to the interest of a secured party (as a good faith purchaser) in those 
same goods.219 Not willing to concede the worthlessness of a subordinated 
reclamation right, sellers have now begun to seek solace in Bankruptcy Code 
section 546(c)(2), which authorizes substitution of an administrative expense 
claim or alternative lien for the claim of a right of reclamation. 
213. The court stated that even if the plants had been effectively rejected, their subsequent 
planting was an act of dominion inconsistent with the seller's ownership, thus amounting to a 
reacceptance. Id. at 442, 708 P.2d at 1043, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 168-69. The court also rejected 
the buyer's contention that its answer, filed as part of the lawsuit, was a sufficient notice of 
revocation of acceptance. As a matter of law, the court concluded that notice given approximately 
one year after delivery of the plants is clearly unreasonable. Id. 
214. See U.C.C. ~ 2-607(3)(a). 
215. The seller's limited right to cure a defective tender is found in U.C.C. § 2-508. 
216. U.C.C. § 1-201(26). 
217. American Fast Print Ltd. v. Design Prints, 288 S.C. 46, 339 S.E.2d 516, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1294 (Ct. App. 1986). The court felt constrained to rule as it did by that state's 
supreme court opinion in Southeastern Steel Co. v. Burton Block & Concrete Co., 273 S.C. 634, 
258 S.E.2d 888, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1151 (1979). The need for written notice was 
squarely rejected in Badger Produce Co. v. Prelude Foods Int'l, 130 Wis. 2d 230, 387 N.W.2d 98, 1 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 422 (Ct. App. 1986). 
218. 11U.S.C.§546(c) (Supp. III 1985). 
219. Although involving the respective rights of unpaid cash sellers and a secured creditor, In re 
Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on reh'g en bane, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), is considered the landmark case upholding the priority of the 
secured creditor. 
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In In re Misco Supply Co., 220 the district court held that the unpaid seller was 
entitled to an administrative priority or a lien on all of the debtor's unencum-
bered assets. Recognizing that application of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)(2) 
depends upon a right of reclamation under state law, the court reached the 
dubious conclusion that although "subject to" the secured party's interest, the 
right of reclamation, nevertheless, continued to exist.221 It is difficult to under-
stand the court's logic. It makes little sense to compensate a seller for a right 
having no value and, by so doing, give that seller more than it would been 
entitled to in the absence of a bankruptcy. Fortunately, not all courts have been 
so magnanimous. 222 
Finally, courts continue to grapple with the question of whether the drafters 
used "insolvency~' in Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) in the sense in which it is 
used in l!.C.C. section 2-702,223 or in the sense in which it is generally used in 
the Bankruptcy Code.224 Authority for either position is growing.225 
Buyer's Money Remedies 
The proper measure of damages for breach of the warranty of title was 
considered for the first time by a Maryland court in Metalcraft, Inc. v. Pratt. 226 
The case arose out of the sale of a marine hardware casting business. As things 
turned out, the seller did not own a number of marine hardware casting 
patterns it purportedly sold, leaving the buyer little choice but to return these 
items to their respective owners. The trial court awarded as damages the value 
of the patterns at the date of dispossession. The buyer asserted, however, that 
U.C.C. section 2-714(2) was controlling and that damages should be measured 
by the "difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the 
goods accepted and the value they would have had ... as warranted."227 
220. 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1662 (D. Kan. 1986). 
221. District Judge Kelly distinguished the present case from one where the right of reclamation 
is lost as a result of the debtor's sale of the goods to a good faith purchaser. If the right of 
reclamation is lost, then there is no right to priority treatment under§ 546(c)(2). Id. at 1667. 
222. See In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52 Bankr. 907, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
185 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (if secured party's lien precludes reclamation there is no right to 
alternative relief); In re FCX, Inc., 62 Bankr. 315, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1193 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) (same). 
223. See U.C.C. § 1-201(23): "A person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his debts in 
the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within the 
meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." 
224. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (Supp. III 1985): "[A]n entity other than a partnership" is 
insolvent if "the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property." 
225. Compare In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 56 Bankr. 899, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Bankruptcy Code definition is controlling) with In re AIC 
Photo, Inc., 57 Bankr. 56, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 90 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (the 
U.C.C. definition should be applied). 
226. 65 Md. App. 281, 500 A.2d 329, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 14 (1985). 
227. U .C.C. § 2-714(2). According to the buyer, the value of the patterns when accepted was 
zero because the seller did not qwn them. Thus, the buyer claimed damages in an amount equal to 
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Therefore, the point of contention was over whether the buyer should be 
permitted to enjoy the use of the patterns without any offset for depreciation. 
On appeal, the appellate court held that the measure of damages selected by 
the trial court was correct. Notwithstanding case law supporting the buyer's 
position228 and uncertainty among scholars concerning the applicability of 
U.C.C. section 2-714(2) to a breach of warranty of title,229 the court thought the 
section "plain and unambiguous" and manifesting a legislative intent that it 
apply to all breaches of warranty under the U.C.C.230 The court next turned to 
the question of whether there were "special circumstances" to take the case out 
of the ordinary U.C.C. section 2-714(2) rule. 231 Because the buyer had use and 
possession of the unique patterns for varying periods of time before title defects 
surfaced, the court concluded that the case did fall within tile special circum-
stances clause of U.C.C. section 2-714(2) and that only the measure of damages 
selected by the trial court would give the buyer the benefit of its bargain without 
overcompensation. 
At issue in "one of the longest relative to the stakes" lawsuits,232 was a 
disappointed buyer's duty of mitigation. In Cates v. Morgan Portable Building 
Corp.,233 the buyers, owners of a motel, ordered portable buildings that would 
add ten rooms to the motel. The buildings were delivered in defective con~ition 
in September 1970. The seller made feeble attempts at repair until March 1971. 
Suit was filed in August 1971. In September 1973, the parties agreed that the 
seller would again try to repair the rooms. Between that date and April 1975, 
intermittent attempts at repair were made but without success. The rooms were 
finally put into working order by the buyers, at their own expense, sometime 
after April 197 5. The trial judge awarded lost profits for two periods: Septem-
berl, 1970, to September 30, 1971, and September 11, 1973, to April 30, 1975. 
The court denied lost profits for the intervening period, October 1, 1971, to 
September 10, 1973, because the buyers had failed to mitigate their damages. 
In an opinion heavily laden with common law references, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Writing for the court, Judge Posner agreed with the 
the value of the patterns at the time of the sale. 65 Md. App. at 291, 500 A.2d at 335, 42 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. at 19. 
228. See, e.g., Murdock v. Godwin, 154 Ga. App. 824, 269 S.E.2d 905, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 572 (1980). 
229. The court cited several scholars who argue that U.C.C. § 2-714(2) is irrelevant to breach of 
warranty of title claims. 65 Md. App. at 292, 500 A.2d at 335, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 19 (citing R. 
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-714:26 (3d ed. 1983); 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, 
Williston on Sales§ 16-8(2) (4th ed. 1974)). 
230. Id. at 293, 500 A.2d at 336, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 20-21. 
231. The measure of damages provided by U.C.C. § 2-714(2) was never intended to be an 
exclusive measure. That same subsection permits use of an alternative formula if "special circum-
stances show proximate damages of a different amount." 
232. This was Judge Posner's characterization of the case, which, when he authored the court's 
opinion, was in its fifteenth year of life. Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 780 F.2d 683, 685, 
42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 451, 452 (7th Cir. 1985). 
233. Id. 
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trial court that although the U.C.C. imposes a duty to mitigate,234 that duty was 
suspended when the seller promised to fix the homes shortly after they were 
delivered. 235 This suspension ended, however, at the expiration of a reasonable 
period of time after April 1971, when it first became clear that the seller would 
not make the necessary repairs. Judge Posner was unwilling to say that the trial 
court's "guess" that six months was a reasonable period .was clearly errone-
ous. 236 Therefore, it was not until October 1971 that the buyers had to take steps 
to mitigate their losses. This duty was again suspended from September 1973 to 
April 1975, when the buyers were once more led to believe that the seller would 
remedy the situation. The court squarely rejected the buyers' argument that a 
duty of mitigation never arose because the seller always had an equal opportu-
nity to mitigate. As the court saw it, recognition of a so-called equal opportunity 
doctrine is "discordant with common law principles, which demand a reason for 
not letting losses lie where they fall." 237 In particular, the doctrine would take 
from buyers the incentive to cut losses even though the buyer can do so more 
efficiently than the seller. 
U.C.C. section 2-718(1) provides that "[d]amages for breach by either party 
may be liquidated in the agreement." The parties are warned, however, that not 
every liquidated damages provision will be acceptable. If it is a "penalty" it is 
void. 238 To be labelled nonpenal, the liquidated amount must be "reasonable in 
the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties 
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining 
an adequate remedy."239 
Whether the agreed upon formula met this standard was the issue before the 
Ninth Circuit in California and Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc. 240 The 
buyer, an agricultural cooperative in the business of transporting raw sugar 
from Hawaii to California, ordered an oceangoing barge for delivery no later 
than June 30, 1981. The parties agreed that the seller would pay, as liquidated 
damages, the sum of $17 ,000 per day should delivery be delayed. The barge was 
234. See U.C.C. § 1-106 comment 1. 
235. On this point, the court stated that "the seller may not insist on mitigation when by its 
words or deeds it has led the buyer to believe that it has assumed what would otherwise be the 
buyer's burden of mitigation." 780 F.2d at 687, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 454. 
236. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's ruling that under Illinois law the 
burden of proof on the issue of mitigation rested with the buyers, but it thought the error harmless 
since allocation of the burden did not seem to affect the trial judge's decision. Id. at 688, 42 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. at 455-56. Although one other case decided during this survey period reached a similar 
conclusion, see Carnation Co. v. Olivet Egg Ranch, 229 Cal. Rptr. 261, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 1531 (Ct. App. 1986), not all courts place the burden of proof on the mitigation of 
damages issue on the breaching seller, see, e.g., M.K. Metals, Inc. v. Container Recovery Corp., 645 
F.2d 583, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 487 (8th Cir. 1981); Cargill, Inc. v. Fickbohm, 252 
N.W.2d 739, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1226 (Iowa 1977). 
237. 780 F.2d at 689, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 457. 
238. U.C.C. § 2-718(1): "A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a 
penalty." 
239. Id. (emphasis added). 
240. 794 F.2d 1433, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1211 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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not delivered when promised and liquidated damages grew to the not insignifi-
cant sum of approximately four million dollars. Although the provision was 
admittedly reasonable when the contract was negotiated, the seller claimed it 
was operatively a penalty when, as things turned out, the net actual loss 
sustained by the buyer was $368,000.241 
Looking to Pennsylvania law for guidance,242 the Ninth Circuit thought that, 
despite the statutory disjunctive for testing the validity of the provision, state 
courts would take into account equitable considerations along with the difficulty 
of establishing actual damages if the clause was rejected. But this professed 
willingness to read U.C.C. section 2-718 in light of common law principles 
proved to be of no help to the seller. In the end, the court was swayed by the 
relative sophistication of the parties and its belief that "[c]ontracts are contracts 
because they contain enforceable promises, and absent some overriding public 
policy, those promises are to be enforced."243 The district court's judgment 
upholding the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision was affirmed 
in all respects. 
In Frank B. Bozzo, Inc. v. Electric Weld Division of the Fort Pitt Division of 
Spang lndustries, 244 the Pennsylvania Superior Court was called upon to decide 
whether a buyer is entitled to have tacked on to its judgment interest from the 
date on which the contract was breached. The seller contended that such 
recovery is unavailable where the amount of damages occasioned by the breach 
was, before judgment, neither liquidated nor ascertainable. The court disagreed. 
In its opinion, the award was not interest but rather "compensation for delay" 
measured by the legal rate of interest. 246 As such, it is an appropriate item of 
incidental damages under U.C.C. section 2-715 if necessary to put the buyer in 
"as good a position as if the other party had fully performed."246 The court 
offered the illustration of a buyer unable to earn interest on money that had to 
be spent to meet the expenses incident to the seller's breach. 247 The court then 
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the circumstances 
warranted an award of compensation for delay. 
241. The anticipated damages were based on expectations of rotting sugar and sugarless 
customers if the barge could not be used to transport the sugar from Hawaii to California. 
Substantial losses were avoided only because the buyer succeeded in finding other shipping. 
242. The contract made Pennsylvania law controlling, presumably because the seller's principal 
place of business was in Pennsylvania. 
243. 794 F.2d at 1438, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1218. The buyer also claimed that it suffered 
$3,732,000 in lost charter revenues. The trial court made no finding on this claim and the Ninth 
Circuit was apparently under the impression that the exact loss, if any, would be difficult to prove. 
What effect the presence of this claim had on the outcome of the case is difficult to measure. See id. 
at 1439, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1219. 
244. 345 Pa. Super. 4~3, 498 A.2d 895, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 213 (1985). 
245. Id. at 431, 498 A.2d at 899, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 218. The court refused to decide 
whether this distinction is of any significance. 
246. The quoted portion in the text is that part of U.C.C. § 1-106 that the court found 
persuasive. 
247. 345 Pa. Super. at 430, 498 A.2d at 898, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 216. 
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The superior court was correct in its observation that at times full compensa-
tion cannot be had without delay damages. But if full compensation is the goal, 
should not the recovery be measured by the rate of interest the buyer would 
otherwise have received rather than what will often be a lower statutory rate of 
interest? 
Seller's Money Remedies 
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co.,248 
discussed several questions pertaining to a seller's U.C.C. section 2-706 right to 
resell goods (that are the subject of a breach) at a private sale and recover the 
difference between the resale price and the contract price. In August 1980, the 
parties entered into a contract for the sale of timber with an agreed upon 
delivery date of "1980." In October 1980, the buyer, without justification, sent a 
letter to the seller unequivocally cancelling the contract. Suit soon followed. In 
its answer, the buyer alleged only that seller was under a duty to mitigate its 
damages. The seller responded by selling the timber to five different purchasers 
at private sales. The major thrust of the buyer's argument, rejected by the trial 
court and asserted on appeal, was the seller's failure to give the statutory 
mandated "reasonable notification of his intention to sell."249 
First, the court held that because notice of intent to sell is part of the seller's 
prima facie case, the buyer is not required to plead lack of notice as a defense. 250 
It then concluded that neither the filing of the complaint nor the buyer's 
knowledge that the goods would be sold can substitute for the statutory notice.251 
Despite the seller's nonentitlement to damages under U.C.C. section 2-706, the 
court affirmed on the basis of U.C.C. section 2-708( 1 ). 252 By concluding that the 
resale price sufficed as proof of market price, the court was able to alter the 
measure of damages but not the result. 253 
The case nicely illustrates the remedial flexibility of the U.C.C. No election 
of remedies is required and the aggrieved party may freely assert alternative 
measures of damages. But one party's flexibility can easily become a trap for the 
other. The party in breach must be always alert to the different potential uses of 
the same evidentiary fact. 
Because the Code provides alternative measures of damages, it is inevitable 
that the aggrieved party will claim the applicability of the measure that provides 
the highest award. The extent to which a seller is permitted to pick and choose 
248. 104 Wash. 2d 751, 709 P.2d 1200, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 202 (1985). 
249. u.c.c. § 2-706(3). 
250. 104 Wash. 2d at 757, 709 P.2d at 1204, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 206. 
251. Id. at 758, 709 P.2d at 1204, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 207. The court was careful to limit its 
decision to the form of complaint before it. The complaint made no mention of an intention to resell 
but sought only damages for breach. Id. 
252. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) establishes damages by computing the difference between the market 
price and the contract price. 
253. 104 Wash. 2d at 758, 709 P.2d at 1205, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 208. 
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was before the court in Union Carbide Corp. v. Consumers Power Co. 254 The 
case involved a contract for the purchase of large quantities of residual fuel oil. 
·The seller, Union Carbide, planned to obtain the oil from Petrosar Limited and 
resell to Consumers at a price computed on the basis of the amount paid to 
Petrosar. As a result, Union Carbide was guaranteed a fixed profit on each 
barrel of oil that Consumers accepted. Subsequently, there was a sharp drop in 
the market price of the oil, which, because it was not passed on to Consumers, 
prompted Consumers to refuse further deliveries. 
Crucial to a determination of the extent of Consumers's liability was which 
subsection of U.C.C. section 2-708 controlled. Atypically, it was the seller, 
Union Carbide, who argued for application of subsection (1 ). A market price 
differential measure of damages would yield the hefty sum of approximately 
$120 million, whereas the profit actually lost on account of the breach amounted 
to a mere $30 million. Relying on the remedial policy expressed in U.C.C. 
section 1-106,255 the court ruled that the reference in the preamble to subsection 
(2) to the "inadequacy" of subsection (1 )'s damages formula was intended to 
include cases of overcompensation as well as undercompensation.256 Emphasiz-
ing the limited applicability of the decision, the court held that where, as here, 
the seller acts as a middleman who assumes no risk of price fluctuations and the 
buyer proves that market price damages will result in overcompensation, 
damages should be calculated under U.C.C. section 2-708(2). 
Although the result seems sound, the court can be faulted for its failure to 
recognize the true problem. U.C.C. section 2-708(1) was never intended to 
apply and its use, therefore, is never appropriate where the seller has never 
acquired the contract goods.257 
Although the U.C.C does not expressly recognize a seller's right to recover 
consequential damages,258 such a recovery is possible if the "lost profit" lan-
guage of U.C.C. section 2-708(2) is liberally applied. In Rogerson Aircraft 
Corp. v. Fairchild lndustries,259 the seller agreed to manufacture component 
parts for an aircraft being developed by the buyer. Following the buyer's 
wrongful termination of the contract, seller sought recovery for lost profits, 
including what it claimed to have lost as a consequence of being shut out of the 
existing aftermarket for spare parts and profits it would have earned on 
prospective parts supply contracts with third-party aircraft manufacturers. 
Quite clearly, both claims are essentially for consequential damages. Neverthe-
254. 636 F. Supp. 1498, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
255. U.C.C. § 1-106 states: "The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered." 
256. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) is applicable only "[i]f the measure of damages provided in subsection 
(1) is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done." 
257. The formula of U.C.C. § 2-708(1) is premised on the ability of the seller to recoup a 
portion of its loss by making a substitutionary disposition of the contract goods. This is, of course, 
impossible if, at the time of the breach, the seller has not yet put itself into position to resell the 
goods. 
258. U.C.C. § 2-715 only addresses the buyer's right to incidental and consequential damages. 
259. 632 F. Supp. 1494, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1512 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
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less, only the latter was denied, not because of its basic nature, but because 
damages of this sort were unforeseeable and too uncertain for computation. 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
Past years provided no shortage of cases dealing with the time of accrual of a 
cause of action for breach of warranty, and this year proved to be no exception. 
The basic rule of U.C.C. section 2-725 is that the cause of action accrues and 
the limitatiol}s period begins to run "when tender of delivery is made."260 What 
of the buyer who is unlucky enough to discover the defect after suit is time-
barred under this basic rule? The answer in most cases is that he is without a 
remedy, that is, unless the buyer can show that the warranty "explicitly extends 
to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the 
time of such performance."261 If it does, then the statute of limitations begins to 
run "when the breach is or should have been discovered."262 Unfortunately, the 
difference between ordinary warranties and "future performance" warranties is 
frequently difficult to discern. 
In Safeway Stores v. Certainteed Corp.,263 a roof, which the seller advertised 
as "bondable up to 20 years," first began to leak seven years after it was 
completed. Two years later, suit was filed. Both the trial court and the court of 
appeals ruled that the buyer's actjon was barred by the four-year limitations 
period as suit was brought nine years after the roof was delivered. 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court concluded that although an 
implied warranty cannot explicitly extend to future performance,264 an express 
warranty, quite clearly, can. It remanded the case for a determination of 
whether the ambiguous warranty, "bondable up to 20 years," is an explicit 
reference to future performance.265 Similarly, representations made in connec-
tion with a twenty-year bond required rejection of a motion for summary 
judgment and raised a question of fact as to whether there was a "prospective 
260. u.c.c. § 2-725(2). 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. 710 S.W.2d 544, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1237 (Tex. 1986). 
264. The bulk of case law is in accord on this point. Courts reaching a similar conclusion during 
this survey period include: Britt v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 637 F. Supp. 734, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1554 (D.D.C. 1986); City of Carlisle v. Fetzer, 381 N.W.2d 627, 42 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1676 (Iowa 1986); Allan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 221 Neb. 528, 378 
N.W.2d 664, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 873 (1985). 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Robertson took exception to this commonly held view because 
"[u]nder § 2-725 the extension to future performance, not the warranty, must be explicit, whether 
the warranty arises expressly or by implication." 710 S.W.2d at 549, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 
1244. 
265. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Wallace asserted that this phrase does not create a future 
performance warranty but is an unambiguous statement that the roof is "capable of being bonded 
for a period of up to 20 years." Id. at 551, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1246 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
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warranty," i.e., a type that need not necessarily be all that explicit about future 
performance. 266 
As an alternative to a future performance warranty, buyers often seek to 
extend the limitations period by arguing that the seller is for some reason 
estopped to raise the statute as a defense. As was pointed out in last year's 
survey, these arguments are rarely successful.267 In Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. 
Budd Co., 268 the buyer of trailers asserted that the seller was equitably estopped 
from pleading the statute because of (i) its attempted repairs and (ii) its delivery 
of a letter two years after the trailers were delivered, in which the seller gave 
assurance that it would stand behind its product. The trial court rejected buyer's 
argument. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, it held that the district 
court's finding that the letter was not an unconditional promise to repair was 
not clearly erroneous. Next, it emphasized the complete absence of evidence that 
the buyer was lulled into inaction by either the letter or the attempted repairs. 
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 269 joins with the cases holding U.C.C. section 
2-725 applicable to warranty claims involving personal injury. Recognizing the 
possibility that the statute could bar a suit even before the injury occurs, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court nevertheless thought that the plain la.nguage of 
U.C.C. section 2-725 and the discernable legislative intent270 command the 
conclusion that the type of damages claimed has no operative effect on the 
statute's scope. A reading of the opinion gives the impression that the court 
might have ruled the way it did because it believed its decision to be of little 
practical importance. As the court observed, an injured party "can still bring an 
action in either negligence or strict liability within four years after the in-
jury ."271 Unfortunately, this sort of reasoning only continues to foster the often 
artificial distinction between tort and contract. 
The division of authority on whether U.C.C. section 2-725 is controlling 
when the action is for indemnity is further reinforced as more courts are called 
upon to decide the issue.272 
266. Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (C<jllaghan) 
462 (Del. Super. 1985). 
267. 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 1, at 1392-93. 
268. 796 F.2d 720, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1234 (4th Cir. 1986). 
269. 716 P.2d 334, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1668 (Wyo. 1986). 
270. According to the court, "If the Wyoming legislature did not intend the UCC's explicit 
statute of limitations to apply to ... actions involving tortious injury or damage, then it could have 
said so in the same manner as have many other state legislatures." Id. at 339, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
at 1673-74. For a discussion of the statutory diversity and a listing of precede!lt, see id. at 338 n.4, 
42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1672 n.4. 
271. Id. at 339-40, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1674-75. Wyoming's basic tort statute is four years. 
Wyo. Stat.§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1977). 
272. Compare Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1480, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 775 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (a claim for indemnity based on breach of warranty is 
governed by U.C.C. § 2-725) with Wingo v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 638 F. Supp. 107, 1 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 389 (W.D. Va. 1986) (implied contract of indemnity is outside the 
U.C.C. and not governed by U.C.C. § 2-725). It is interesting to note that, in Richardson, the court 
found a "future performance warranty" even though the basis of the indemnity claim was breach of 
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BULK TRANSFERS 
The revision of article 6 is still under active consideration as Professor Steven 
Harris details in his discussion of the "new approach" immediately following 
this portion of the 1987 Annual Survey.273 
Sbar's, Inc. v. New Jersey Art & Craft Distributors274 again indicates the 
need for a new approach for the buyer at a bulk sale who has not sent the 
necessary notices. The case was complicated by the bankruptcy of the debtor 
and the fact that the bulk sale buyer had paid the consideration into the 
bankruptcy court pursuant to an order of that court. The bankruptcy court paid 
the moneys out in satisfaction of an IRS lien and administrative expenses, but 
the state court noted that there were insufficient moneys left to answer the 
claims of unsecured creditors. 
Plaintiff sued the bulk sales purchaser in the state court and was awarded the 
full amount of its claim. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court reversed275 
but required the trial court to determine the fair value of the property trans-
ferred. The court reasoned that the "defendant may be ordered to satisfy the 
debt ... only to the extent of the fair value of the goods transferred,"276 with 
credit for all payments made by the trustee in bankruptcy to creditors through 
the bankruptcy court and pursuant to its order. Presumably this would include 
the administrative expenses. 
On one score, the buyer who fails to give notice is subject to liability if the 
resulting appraisals show he made a good bargain even though it was not good 
enough to result in a fraudulent conveyance.277 But at least one other creditor is 
suing the buyer, and in a footnote the court carefully expressed no opinion as to 
how the proceeds should be divided. But should the rp.atter be left to state law 
when a bankruptcy has intervened? Should not recovery, if any, go to the 
trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of all creditors? 278 
There were no other cases of sufficient interest under article 6. 
an implied warranty. The reason was the presence of an express statement in the contract making 
the term of implied warranties coextensive with that of the 10-year express warranty. 
273. Harris, The Article 6 Drafting Committee's New Approach to Asset Acquisitions, infra. 
There appears to be considerable opposition to the proposed approach. 
274. 205 N.J. Super. 516, 501 A.2d 560, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 535 (App. Div. 
1985). 
275. The court stated that the bulk purchaser was not discharged by payment into the 
bankruptcy court. The discharge unoer N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 12A:6-106(4) (West Supp. 1986) operates 
"only where the consideration is paid jnto the County Court and written notice thereof by certified 
or registered mail is given to the creditors. Defendant has not satisfied either of these conditions." 
205 N.J. Super. at 518, 501 A.2d at 561, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 536. 
276. 205 N.J. Super. at 518, 501 A.2d at 561, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 536. 
277. Indeed, if not sold for a "reasonably equivalent value," would not the proper claimant be 
the bankruptcy trustee under 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987) as the debtor was 
insolvent on the date of the transfer and filed one month thereafter? Would not a payment to a 
successful plaintiff in a state court also be a preference? Id. § 547. The transfer is "on account of an 
antecedent debt," it would seem. Id. § 547(b)(2) (1982). 
278. While the cause of action is vested in the creditor, not the debtor, the payments are clearly 
for debts of the bankrupt. 
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DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 
Two cases under article 7 discussed the effect in bankruptcy of a warehouse-
man's lien under U.C.C. section 7-209 where a warehouseman fails to issue a 
warehouse receipt covering the stored property. 
In Cataldo v. Casey b Hayes, Inc. (In re Knoware, Inc.), 219 one week before 
it filed for bankruptcy, the debtor had the warehouseman move and store a 
portion of its personal property. A warehouse receipt covering the goods was not 
mailed to the debtor until after the debtor had filed for bankruptcy. The 
warehouseman asserted a li~n on the stored goods for moving and storage 
charges, and the bankruptcy trustee challenged the validity of the lien on the 
ground that no warehouse receipt had been issued before bankruptcy. The 
bankruptcy court ruled for the trustee under subsection 545(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 280 The 'court reasoned that since U.C.C. section 7-209 creates a 
lien on "goods covered by a warehouse receipt" and since U.C.C. section 1-
201 ( 45) defines a warehouse receipt as an "issued" receipt, the lien under 
section 7-209 is dependent upon the issuance of a warehouse receipt. The court 
further held that "issuance" required mailing of the receipt. Since the ware-
houseman proved only that an envelope containing the receipt had been placed 
in the warehouseman's outgoing mail bin and not that the envelope had been 
deposited in the U.S. mails, the court held that there was no evidence that the 
warehouse receipt had been mailed before bankruptcy.281 Therefore, the ware-
houseman had no lien under U.C.~. section 7-209 valid against the trustee in 
~~~. ' 
In re Charter Co. 282 concerned a similar dispute in bankruptcy. In that case, 
the debtor oil company made contractual arrange~ents with the warehouseman 
for storage of its petroleum products inventory. Inventory was being constantly 
added to and sold from the inventory stored with the warehouseman, who kept 
records of inventory receipts and disbursements and rendered monthly inventory 
statements. When the debt9r filed' for bankruptcy, the warehouseman claimed a 
lien for various charges under U.C.C. section 7-209. The debtor challenged the 
validity of the lien, and tjle court rule~ for the debtor. It found that the lien was 
279. 57 Bankr. 163, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 998 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). 
280. Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part: 
T~e trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to the extent 
that such lien-
(2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the commencement of the case against a 
bona fide purchaser that purchases such property at the time of the commencement of the case, 
whether or not such a purchaser exists .... 
11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
281. Testimony by a competent witness that it was office custom for an employee to retrieve 
envelopes from the outgoing mail bin and deposit them in the U.S. mails might have sufficed to 
prove that the receipt had been mailed. See Leasing Assocs. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 
(8th Cir. 1971) and authorities cited therein. 
282. 56 Bankr. 91, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 280 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). 
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not perfected and, thus, voidable under section 545(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The court held the issuance of a warehouse receipt by a warehouseman to be a 
condition to the existence of· a lien under U.C.C. section 7-209. It then 
concluded that the various inventory records were not warehouse receipts for 
two reasons: (i) They did not contain certain terms required by U.C.C. section 
7-202(2); and (ii) some of the documents had not been issued as required by 
U.C.C. section 1-201 ( 45 ). 
Both of these cases hold that a warehouseman does not have a lien on stored 
goods under U.C.C. section 7-209 that is valid in bankruptcy if the warehouse-
man does not issue a warehouse receipt covering the goods.283 
These cases are correct as far as they go. They do not preclude the ware-
houseman from prevailing in bankruptcy on a theory of common law ware-
houseman's lien. At common law, the warehouseman had a possessory lien on 
stored goods. The lien was specific, that is, it was only for charges on the stored 
goods and not for charges on other transactions with the bail or. 284 Yet, the lien 
conferred no right to sell the stored goods to satisfy the lien; the warehouseman 
merely had the right to keep the goods until he was paid.285 
The sections in the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act ("U.W.R.A.") gov-
erning the warehouseman's lien (upon which U.C.C. section 7-209 is based) 
were not expressly premised upon the issuance of a warehouse receipt. These 
sections made the common law lien general286 and added a right of sale287 but did 
not otherwise displace the common law lien.288 In the same fashion, U.C.C. 
section 7-209 does not expressly displace the common law lien. Nor does the 
drafting history of that section indicate such an intention; rather, the intention 
was to expand the coverage of the common law lien.289 Although even the 
earliest draft of this section expressly presumed the issuance of a warehouse 
receipt,290 there is no mention of the reason for this change from the U.W.R.A. 
in any of the notes or comments to the section. Probably the reason is that the 
drafters intended the article 7 refinements of the common law warehouseman's 
lien to apply only if a warehouse receipt were issued. Absent such a receipt, the 
drafters probably would have agreed that the common law lien survived.291 
283. See also Richwagen v. Lilienthal, 386 So. 2d 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Dathar Corp. 
v. Lemkin, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). 
284. 1 L. Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Liens 981-1002 (3d ed. 1914). 
285. Id. at 990-91. 
286. Unif. Warehouse Receipts Act§ 27, 3 U.L.A. 139 (1959). 
287. Id.§ 33, 3 U.L.A. 152. 
288. State v. Amarillo Transfer & Storage Co., 94 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); cf 
Jewett v. City Transfer & Storage Co., 128 Cal. App. 556, 18 P.2d 351 (1933). 
289. A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Commercial Code, Tentative Draft No. I-Article VI,§ 13 (Apr. 
19, 1948), reprinted in 4 A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Uniform Commercial Code-Drafts§ 13, at 239, 
& note, at 262-63 (Kelly ed. 1984 ). 
290. Id. 
291. Cf 1 A.L.I. Proceedings, 26th Annual Meeting 81 (1949) (colloquy between Messrs. 
Flory, Schnader, and Pepper). 
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This result accords with reason. Certainly a creditor cannot claim that the 
lien is secret. The warehouseman's possession of the stored goods is sufficient to 
put creditors of the bailor on notice.292 The issuance of a warehouse receipt to 
the bailor does not further the policy of notice to creditors. Thus, the failure to 
issue a warehouse receipt should not invalidate an otherwise valid common law 
warehouseman's lien. 
The assertion of a common law lien would probably allow the warehouseman 
to prevail against the trustee in bankruptcy. Generally, common law possessory 
liens are respected in bankruptcy.293 Thus, had the warehousemen in Cataldo 
and In re Charter Co. asserted common law lien rights, they might well have 
prevailed. 
This is not to say that there is no reason to issue a warehouse receipt. Good 
business practice would dictate that. Further, if no receipt is issued, U.C.C. 
section 7-210, which permits the warehouseman to sell the goods, is inapplica-
ble. This remits the warehouseman to his limited common law rights as they 
may have been supplemented by non-Code statutes. 
292. Cf U.C.C. § 9-305 (possession of goods perfects security interest). 
293. 48 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 1007, n.19c (14th ed. 1978). 
